

# **SPECIAL REPORT**

*OF*

COUNCILMAN

# **FRANK CAPRIO**

*ON THE*

## **Administrative and Hiring Procedures**

*OF*

## **Progress for Providence, Inc.**

SUBMITTED DECEMBER, 1969

CITY OF  
PROVIDENCE

COMMITTEE ON URBAN REDEVELOPMENT  
RENEWAL AND PLANNING

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REPORT OF THE  
ADMINISTRATIVE AND HIRING PRACTICES  
OF  
PROGRESS FOR PROVIDENCE, INC.

RECEIVED BY CITY COUNCIL

DECEMBER 1969

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THE SAME BE RECEIVED

*Vernice V. Cooper*

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I. P R E F A C E

The following are findings and recommendations derived from the hearings recently conducted by the City Council investigation into the activities of Progress for Providence.

This report is, in no way meant to be all conclusive, nor is it intended to be dispositive of any of the critical issues dealt with. The intent herein is merely to help clarify for the Council and the people of Providence the chairman's observations from a review of voluminous material furnished the committee.

The writer has, as much as is possible, actively attempted to be objective, to make criticism and to offer solutions. Certainly, no one man engaging such an undertaking can be entirely all comprehensive, but certainly no one should shirk from the responsibility of doing his utmost to help those in his community most in need of this assistance. The bulk of what will appear in the following pages is taken from the testimony illicitated before the committee as it was received by the committee. The conclusions - my own - I present for your review.

If I may digress to momentarily recall to mind some of the circumstances which prompted, our sessions so one might better understand many of the occurrences which took place both during and subsequent to our brief but rather stimulating series of hearings.

Prior to these hearings I had been receiving a number of inquiries concerning the operations of Progress for Providence from residents all over the city. Like many others throughout our community, I shared a deep respect for the agency's purpose but admitted to a somewhat shallow knowledge as to its precise functions. Some of these inquiries raised grievous doubts in my mind relative to the impact that the agency's

activities were having on the eventual and ultimate eradication of poverty in our community. Pursuant to this concern, I asked and received from the City Council permission to allow this committee to explore the administrative practices of Progress for Providence.

This review was welcomed by the agency heads, the press and civic bodies. A great deal of community interest was manifested by requests to testify before the committee which were received by both Mr. Caprio [REDACTED] and our most gracious City Clerk Mr. Vincent Vespia. In fact many of our fellow citizens attended each and every meeting of our committee, all of whom, I may add, worked most assiduously and zealously toward bringing about a better, more cohesive and responsive agency for the less fortunate of our city,

During the course of the committee's hearings we were faced with a number of unusual occurrences in the nature of demonstrations, walkouts, and other manifestations of community interest in our poverty program.

Whatever the past difficulties which arose I can only hope that this report will serve as some help in making our community an enlightened example of social progress causing future generations of our citizens to be grateful for our present concern rather than regretful of our continued neglect.

Once again I would like to express my deep and heartfelt thanks to the Mayor and employees of the City of Providence, the Council members, the Executive Director and employees of Progress for Providence, and all of the citizens of our city who helped make this what was for me a most meaningful and rewarding experience, and which I hope will prove to be such for every citizen of our City.

## II. EMPLOYMENT AND HIRING

EMPLOYMENT AND HIRING:

The criticisms of employment and hiring practices covered the gamut from the original recruiting system to the problems of terminations. Therefore in that order:

A. Democratic trappings to disguise autocratic and arbitrary hiring practices:

The agency appears to have or have had a complicated system of advertising, screening and hiring. This system, while designed to provide equal job opportunities for all, actually ends up simply snarling programs and delaying the delivery of needed services, while often excluding the very persons who should be hired because of ability, poverty or residency criteria.

An example of this was cited in the elaborate screening procedure for the CEP. Mr. Lachapelle described the screening procedures, beginning with question 242.

"...at the board of directors' meeting, where the program was actually passed, it was recommended we set up a screening committee made up of a representative from each target area, plus five appointed by the chairman of the board." (242) "The screening committee was recommended by a member of the neighborhood advisory committee chairmen. " (242) "The screening committee was to review applications, to see that it was broadly advertised, and to review the applications in terms of qualifications." (247) "...they did make several recommendations." (249)

In question 253, "They make recommendations to you?" Mr. Lachapelle responded, "that is correct." Then further, Mr. Lachapelle elaborated on the system, indicating that applicants who were recommended or rejected might not actually be considered in the final screening by



himself and the Executive Committee . To answer to Mr. Caprio's question 254:...."Who would actually place me on the payroll in the CEP program?"

A. "The way the program was set up was that the people that qualified were referred to myself. If I were to make an appointment, I would then meet with the Executive Committee, who would concur on the appointment. So the appointing authority was with myself as Executive Director, with concurrence from the Executive Committee."

The testimony reinforces itself in the responses to the questions that follow. In question 258, he indicates the real power of this screening committee, recommended originally by a representative of the neighborhoods:

Q. 258: "The action of the screening committee was not mandatory as far as you were concerned?"

A. "Initially the screening committee was set up - that is right, the appointing authority within the agency was the director ....."

In question 260, he states that "as far as the screening committee there were meetings after meeting....," and in 263 he agreed with the question that "they deliberated long hours?"

A. "Yes, and the fact is that the screening committee actually included the screening of two positions. This was the position of Director and Deputy Director."

After these lengthy deliberations by a group of 14 volunteers, they made recommendations on these two positions to the director. Several witnesses, in addition to Mr. Lachapelle, testified to the results of these recommendations.

MR. LACHAPELLE: (testimony from 266 - 291)

In regard to the position of the Director, Mr. Lachapelle testified . . .

that the committee submitted six names to him, and he in turn reviewed these applications and made a recommendation to the Executive Committee which has final responsibility for the hiring. The Executive Committee concurred on his choice for director, a choice which was not shared by the screening committee.

In re. the position of the Deputy Director, the screening committee recommended the names of people that they felt qualified to Mr. Lachapelle. From approximately twenty (20) applications, they forwarded 10 (274, 275, 278). The name of the man who was finally appointed Deputy Director was not one of these names (272, 277), yet he was appointed (271, 273) on the recommendation of Mr. Long (282) to Mr. Lachapelle, and Mr. Lachapelle to the Executive Committee (283) (285). How Mr. Long interposed himself into the hiring process never was made clear in the testimony. According to Mr. Lachapelle, this was done on the basis of his qualifications and background (288, 290).

KATHLEEN V. MCNEIL:

Miss McNeil testified that Mr. Long was present at his own screening for the position of Director of CEP. As part of her testimony she stated (8): "...We had the sub-screening committee. We went through the application. May I say at this particular meeting, Mr. Long, the Director of the CEP program was present, and chairman of the meeting at the time. (She later indicated that he was not chairman, simply present.) We went through the applications, and we forwarded - I can't tell you how many - six or seven of those applications. There were about three outstanding ones, who had degrees, qualifications, recommendations, and were excellent. They were not appointed." She comments that the CEP application... "even stated then he (Mr. Long) would be the Director of the CEP program." (14) then

more in 18,42,45) This application was dated June 14, 1968, 3 months before the screening committee was established and the jobs were advertised in the newspaper.

Miss McNeil also testified regarding the manner in which Mr. Mangum was appointed as Deputy Director of the program: "...Each application was brought out and we raised our hand and signified whether we thought the qualifications should be considered by the Executive Board. Mr. Mangun's application, to my knowledge, there were six against, and two for. What I was wondering, and I am still very distressed about, on the back of each application it says, 'Have you had a criminal record?' I would like to know why that is there if it doesn't mean something, or is that a criteria for these positions? I am beginning to think it is." (25) In response to the question concerning whether Mr. Mangum's application was approved by the screening committee, Miss McNeil stated "Definitely not. In fact, it was even in the press that it was six to two. I called Mr. Lachapelle that night when I heard it, and I asked him could it be possible that he was appointed when the application hadn't been forwarded. He said, 'Yes, I recommended him.' I said, 'Someone out to recommend that we have a new director.'" (28)

According to Miss McNeil's testimony, the committee was interested in experience, education and other qualifications and did not look closely at those applicants who seemed to lack these qualifications: "The application, when you saw a person with a degree and their experience and recommendations, naturally those were the ones you would be interested in." (33) However, the committee did not check to ascertain whether the information contained on the application was true: "There was no checking at all, whatsoever." (34), and in 35 and 36, she states that they had to take the word of the applicants, and that "no, on any

applications, even in the community we don't have a check. We just take the answers on the application."

It is interesting to note that in spite of Miss McNeil's testimony that they did not look closely at those applications that did not have impressive qualifications, Mr. Mangum cites considerable experience outside of this criminal record, including college and training (6 of his testimony).

MARIO TURCHETTA:

Mr. Turchetta also testified as to the activities of the screening committee, Mr. Lachapelle, and the Executive Committee concerning the hiring for the two positions screened by the CEP screening committee. "As it first started with the CEP program, that is the Concentrated Employment Program, they advertised. A lot of these applications were for different job openings in the CEP program. The top spot was the CEP director. There were about six people that applied for the job with M.A.'s, B.A.'s, B.S.'s, they weren't even considered. A man was taken with a high school equivalency. I am talking about John Long. He was promised this job way back in June. Cleo Lachapelle knew this. I don't even know why he let other people fill out the applications. He had it in his mind John Long was the man, and that was it. There was nothing to it, it was all cut and dried, and nothing said. If you had an M.A., B.A., a B.S. or Ph.D., it didn't make a difference. Cleo Lachapelle wanted John Long, and .... (so did) Seth Gifford. You couldn't change their mind." (6)

In regard to the Deputy Director position, Mr. Turchetta testified as follows:

"....The deputy director, we screened, and I happened to be on the screening committee. I was a delegate to that committee, We screened

about 70 people for this deputy director's job. The fellow that has it now was turned down by the screening committee but Mr. Lachapelle brought him to the Executive Committee and got him passed. Today he is the deputy director. There was no consideration given to the other people."

(7)

It is unclear what happened to this committee as there is not testimony to that effect. It would appear the people got disgusted. In any event, the final screening and recommendations to Cleo on staff for CEP was accomplished by the Central Staff members.

The testimony reveals that CEP was not the only occasion for questionable (to be kind) hiring practices. The subject came up again and again in the testimony, listing many cases in which procedures established by the agency for advertising, screening and hiring was disregarded. Taking them case by case, following testimony on each case in the order in which they came to light at the hearings, we find the following.

CHARLES F. LANIGAN:

Speaking in terms of OEO criteria, Mr. Lanigan certainly should have been hired for something. He is a resident of the area, having lived there most of his life (24), with the exception of a few years. Therefore, he is familiar with the neighborhood, its residents and its problems. He is married, unemployed, and has nine minor children. He applied for the position of Staff Assistant to the Neighborhood Advisory Committee, which requires that the person come from the neighborhood, be familiar with its problems, and assist the NAC in its technical problems. (Personally, I think he was eminently qualified. I have also learned that his wife also applied for a job in the agency, Vocational Counselor. Since she was a

registered nurse, it was recommended that she be hired in the health program, and apparently she agreed, indicating that she didn't know they were hiring. She was not hired either, so these people were left to shift for themselves. I don't know who was hired, and why Mr. Lanigan wasn't, except that I was informed that they were "troublemakers".)

In his opening remarks, Mr. Lanigan read a letter into the record in which he described some of his experiences in attempting to find employment in the poverty program.(209) He applied for a job as Staff Assistant, salary \$8,000, on December 12, 1966. The application includes a section on numbers of dependents, and obviously indicated that he was eligible under the poverty criteria, since he was and still is unemployed. On January 20, 1967, Mr. William McNamara, then Executive Director, wrote to him describing the reasons why he was not hired. The letter also stated that Mr. Lanigan's application would be kept in file. Mr. Lanigan has received no further information on the status of his application - apparently he's still on file. He also stated that "On several occasions during the past year I have personally asked Mr. Cleo Lachapelle, the Director of Progress for Providence, for information on my application and received no service on my request." He also states that he spoke to Mr. DePetrillo who told him an appointment would be made for him within a week. The date of that was November 10th of this year. Mr. Lanigan has not received any further communication.

Upon investigation, Mr. Lanigan discovered that the person who was appointed had an income "more than double the ceiling placed on the income criteria that qualified a recipient for program benefits." (p. 211) He states that Mr. McNamara and Mr. Lachapelle "were highly influenced by a political pressure placed on their selection procedure

by an elected official who held close family relationship with the successful applicant. This charge, if confirmed by proper authorities, reflects a direct violation of the Hatch Act and the deliberate employment of nepotism by those responsible." (p. 211)

Why Mr. Lanigan really was not hired seems somewhat of a mystery. This position actually was filled through the Neighborhood Advisory Committee, since the job is responsible to them. Although I think he has a complaint, rather than "Political Pressure" his problem might fall under topic "poor communication" or "non-communication". Somebody at least should have dignified his requests with an interview and some vocational counselling or direction to other jobs in the agency,

ROBERT BAILEY:

In terms of hiring, Mr. Bailey was interested in discriminatory practices, especially relating to abuse of the OEO Memo 23-A. In responding to Question 26, "What do you feel the hang-ups are coming from, towards hiring those that have criminal records, are they within the agency itself?", Mr. Bailey replied, "There is a thing that I always hear 23-A, I believe it is, that always seems to come about. It never seems to come about until black people are involved....."

This statement, however, is in conflict with Mr. Lachapelle's comments in his original testimony concerning Mr. Mangum (290), in which he stated some familiarity with the latter's record, but is willing to overlook it and recommend him to a position of power and high (\$10,500) salary.

MARIO TURCHETTA:

Mr. Turchetta continued his testimony after commenting on the hiring for the CEP. As part of his response to "cut and dried" hiring for CEP

he continued, "Then we have Alan Skvirsky, Director of Education. The job wasn't even advertised." (8)

In the case of the directorship of On-the-Job Training, another CEP component, Mr. Turchetta states that "when we got him up before the Executive Committee, and screening it out, we felt Mr. McGann was more qualified to be a liaison, which was a thousand dollars more. He was well qualified for the position. This left the OJT jacket vacant. There were no other applicants in the OJT jacket. What Cleo was supposed to do was advertise this job. At the next Executive Committee, I picked up the jacket and found an applicant's name in there, just one." (14) When asked why the job was not advertised, Mr. Lachapelle said that the program was running behind and they had to get the program off the ground." (15) The man whose application was in the jacket did receive the job,

In responding to questions 18, 19, 20 and 24 Mr. Turchetta discussed the job openings that presently existed in Progress for Providence, Administrative Assistant to the Director, and Public Information Officer. The position of Public Information Officer was being advertised, but Mr. Joseph Connell still held that title. "Right now he (Mr. Connell) is doing what he is doing now, Public Information Officer. He cuts newspapers."...Continuing on the same question (25) Mr. Turchetta stated, "One fellow even gave himself a raise, the finance officer (Mr. Zaidman)."

Needless to say, the implication of all this (18, 19, 20 and 24) was that the position was advertised to fulfill federal requirements, but the job was already filled. Mr. Lachapelle went through the motions of "screening all day yesterday", but everyone knew who would become the Administrative Assistant. Of course, it came out that way.



Mr. Turchetta also had his feelings, re. use of 23-A. In Q. 32 he discussed its use in hiring of persons with criminal records, "Cleo Lachapelle used 23-A the way he feels. To some he gives the job; others he won't. In our area we had someone up for a job, a good man. He gave two months of his time and spent his own money and didn't get paid and wasn't reimbursed and did a terrific job. Cleo said he comes under 23-A and couldn't be hired. Then he turns around and hires guys with a record a mile long in other areas. " In Q. 33 "Has there been discrimination because of criminal records in hiring for jobs," Mr. Turchetta replied "There has been a lot".

Finally, Mr. Turchetta commented on discrimination in hiring based on race. In his closing remarks he states, "...it is like discrimination they call. Mr. Seth Gifford made a statement at one time, we were looking for a deputy director. He said, 'The position has to go to a black man.' Don't misunderstand me, when he said 'black man', if the black man is qualified and there is nobody else qualified he gets the position. But when he said 'this position should go to a 'black man', let's change the one word, he should have said, 'this position should go to an Italian or Irish man', we would be in federal court. Then we would see about the discrimination. It is like reverse discrimination. What he should have said, 'This position has to be advertised and the best qualified man fits the job, whether he be black or white \*' Mr. Turchetta stated that Mr. Gifford made this announcement at a Board of Directors meeting and that Rev. Benjamin Mitchell (a black man) got the job.

Thus Mr. Turchetta enumerated circumstances indicating various kinds of job discrimination in hiring practices, including unilateral decisions made without benefit of the committees responsible for the hiring function,

discrimination against those with criminal records and reverse discrimination, and irrational and abusive use of OEO hiring guidelines.

MYRON NALBANDIAN:

In 208 and 209, Dr. Nalbandian states in conflict, that he thinks qualifications should enter into the selection and that "If Mr. Lachapelle wants to hire an administrative assistant, it is his prerogative."; a prerogative that apparently consistently extends well beyond the realm of administrative assistant.

It is interesting to note that the Director of Research and Planning cannot possibly do anything to rectify these confused and frustrating hiring procedures. On page 380 Mr. Caprio asked Dr. Nalbandian "are the hiring procedures designed for the screening committee to screen applicants and recommend who is to be hired?". To this the witness replied: "I simply don't know." Later in the dialogue, Dr. Nalbandian states, "I think if I am to be the Director of Planning, Research and Evaluation, I should be permitted to hire my own professional staff, and certainly no neighborhood committee is going to define for me what the competence of an individual is, where I, as a professional, can define it."

When Mr. Caprio asked the witness, "That has been the procedure throughout the agency?", Dr. Nalbandian again replied, "I don't know. I simply do not know what it has been."

Finally, when asked his opinion on the practice of advertising for a professional position, the witness said, "No, I don't think so - only in terms of getting applicants who can be defined by the individual in charge."

There seems to be a great discrepancy between the Agency's stated hiring procedures and what actually occurs. Some positions are advertised,

some are not. Screening and personnel committees do exist but the director can override their decisions with no difficulty. In effect, they are a rubber stamp group and provide meaningless activities for the volunteers whose time they take in the wasteful attempt to display a unilateral appointment as a community resolve.

In a more insidious vein, the existence of these paper groups leads the neighborhood residents to believe that there is actually a logical order through which they and others obtain jobs in the poverty program. In practice, however, they see that it is otherwise and technicalities such as 23-A can be effectively used against them. The agency supposedly most responsive to them and their advocate, in effect, takes advantage of their lack of experience and renders them impotent in choosing those who are supposed to be working directly for them. This in turn leads to suspicion and lack of faith in all the poverty activities, for here is the single most important aspect of the program, economic betterment especially for the poverty groups. They are relegated to accepting the choices of others, an oft-felt experience, and once more find they have no control over their own fates. In its paternalistic posture, the agency has usurped one of the most important experiences of the program: the right of the recipients to determine their own fates, shape their own destinies and determine who shall deliver services for them and receive the benefits of increased income, and finally, the right to make and learn from their own mistakes in that most sensitive area, hiring of personnel they must work with every day.

Finally, while the system does not work, and has obviously bred suspicion in the neighborhoods, and on the part of the employees working in the program, the prospects for any change from within seem dim. It seems fair to predict that since changes should be the result of objective evaluation of existing procedures, this cannot occur, since the Director of

Research and Evaluation, by his own admission "does not know" what goes on in the hiring process.

B. Salaries and Job Descriptions; Opportunities for Advancement within the Agency.

From its very title, the act which funds the poverty program is an "Economic Opportunity Act". It certainly appears Central Staff has acted on every opportunity to increase its own economic position. In an agency which should upgrade poor people economically, the heaviest burden on the budget was personnel costs, with one of the largest staffs in the state. Personnel costs for the Agency average 85% of the budget according to Mr. Zaidman, the Director of Personnel and Administration.(115).

This is a most illuminating if not startling admission when one considers that "Of some 8 million expended by mid-1967 7 million had gone to salaries. Just what the poor got out of it was hard to see. In July 1967, for the first time anywhere OEO placed the Syracuse community action program into trusteeship." \* pg 133, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding by Daniel P. Moynihan. According to Mr. Zaidman's own admission, Providence seems to be the counterpart of Syracuse's 1967 failure. One can only hope Providence does not suffer their fate and fall into trusteeship.

Given the intent of the Act, the problems of other communities and percentage of the costs for its implementation in Providence which are directed to direct payments of salaries, the most important question then to be considered may properly be, who are these people, how much are they earning for their jobs, what are they doing and what happens to them once they enter the "poverty system".

The order of this section is therefore based on job descriptions, which consists of title, salary scale, duties, responsibilities and lines of supervision.

The critical testimony directed at the agency in this area seemed concentrated on salaries and advancement and opportunities for poor people. These become slightly confused and often overlap, but for the purposes of reporting they will be somewhat arbitrarily categorized.

#### 1. TITLE AND SALARY

Mr. Chester George found the core of the entire problem of title and salary, when he started as part of his testimony that "As far as more people getting the full benefit, I don't see how they can do it if you have the high salaries at the top. Within the last three years, community schools and other programs, instead of increasing the salaries, you have been cutting or whittling it away little by little. You say how come it is not an effective program. Each year you cut back, and as other people said, the only one that is feeling the cutback are the poor people. We know on the top they are not taking cutbacks. They get raises in their salaries I don't know why they call it a poverty program." (18)

"Would it be fair...that Progress for Providence is top heavy in employment as far as wages is concerned..?"

"As far as filtering it down there is none. It is all at the top." (23)

There is a wide discrepancy in the salaries paid in the agency, with the director receiving almost four times as

much per year as the average aide. In general, the aides are at the bottom, making just above the minimum wage, \$1.75 - \$1.85 per hour, while the professional make somewhat above the statewide average. The table that follows, Number 1, indicates the comparability of salaries between Progress for Providence and the State of Rhode Island for jobs similar titles and duties.

TABLE I

19 a.

Progress for Providence  
CAA Administration

State of Rhode Island  
Salary Comparabilities

1) Executive Director \$18,000	AAAdministrator-Child Wel. Serv. \$13,754 - \$15,756
2) Public Information Ofcr. \$8,310	Labor Relations Specialist (DES) \$ 7,566 - \$9,048
3) Administrative Asst. \$8,310	Asst. to Dir. (Dept. of Admin.) \$ 9,595 - \$11,492
4) Deputy Director \$14,800	Asst. Chief-Statewide Planning \$13,182 --\$15,080
5) Adm. Asst. Deputy Director \$7,925	Administrative Asst. \$6,266 - \$7,488
6) Program Manager \$13,450	Associate Commissioner of Ed. \$13,182 - \$15,080
7) Manager Bus, Adm. \$13,450	Sr. Depart, Business Mgr. \$9,595 - \$11,492
8) Controller \$12,200	Controller \$16,302 - \$18,668
9) Budget Rec, Acct. \$7,550	Asst. Budget Examiner \$7,228 --\$8.632
10) Chief Accountant \$8,725	Senior Accountant \$8,346 - \$9,984
11) Purchasing Agent \$6,250	Asst. Business Mgr. Officer \$6,266 - \$7,488
12) Payroll Officer \$6,550	Auditor \$6,266 - \$7,488
13) Dir. of Personnel & Trng. \$12,200	Asst. Chief-Employees Relation \$7,930 - \$9,542
14) Personnel Specialist \$5,660	Personnel Officer \$7,228 - \$8,632
15) Training Specialist \$10,100	Training Consultant \$8,346 - \$9,984
16) Manpower Coordinator \$14,000	Chief, Div. of Placement (DES) \$11,544 - \$13,780



Clerical Staff of CAA

1) Executive Secretary \$6,250	Secretary to Dir. of Adm. \$7,930 - \$9,542
2) Secretary - Program Manager \$4,680	Senior Clerk-Typist \$4,082 - \$4,810
3) Secretary Business Mgr. \$4,250	Senior Clerk-Typist \$4,082 - \$4,810
4) Disbursing Clerk \$5,400	Chief Clerk \$5,460 - \$6,474
5) Personnel Receptionist \$5,400	Chief Clerk \$5,460 - \$6,474
6) Receptionist \$4,900	Senior Clerk \$3,900 - \$4,628
7) Copy Room Operator \$5,150	Senior Clerk \$3,900 - \$4,628
8) Sorter Technician 4,040	Clerk \$3,900 - \$4,446
9) Aides \$3,180 - \$4,250 (\$1.75 entry) (full time) \$962 - \$1154 (part time)	Case Aides (Dept. of Wel.) \$5,460 - \$6,474 entry \$2.16 hr
10) Secretary \$4,000 - \$5,200	Senior Clerk Typist \$4,082 - \$4,810
11) Economic Dev. Specialist \$12,200	Chief, Div. of Benefits (DES) \$11,544 - \$13,780
12) Asst, Econ, Dev, Officer \$9,150	Asst. Public Asst. Manager \$8,346 - \$9,984
13) Neigh. Econ. Dev. Planner \$8,310	Junior Planner \$6,890 - \$8,242
14) Education Specialist \$12,800	Consultant in Curriculum Ser. \$10,530 - \$12,610
15) Community School Spec. \$8,310 m	Consultant - Education \$9,152 - \$10,946
16)	

NON-PROFESSIONALS

1) Aides (School) \$1.85 hr.	Case Aide (\$2.84 hr.
2) Non Certified Teacher \$7,500	Teacher \$5,694 - \$6,812
3) Custodians (\$1.85 hr.) \$1,388	Janitor (\$2.04 hr.) \$4,082 - \$4,810
4) Clerks \$3,170	Clerk \$3,900 - \$4,446 Cler

YOUTH DEVELOPMENT

1) Youth Dev. Director \$7,200	Employment Counselor \$6,032 - \$7,332
2) Group Work Aides \$4,040 (\$3.00 Hr)	Employment Coun selor Group Worker \$5,460 - \$6,630
3) Youth Dev. Sepcialist \$11.650	Supvr. of DES Placement Ofcs. \$9,594 - \$11,492
4) J. D. Specialist \$8,310	Supvr. of Ed. Services \$7,930 - \$9,542
5) Welfare Specialist \$10,100	Chief of Comm. Emp. Dev. and Training \$9,152 - \$10,946

On the other hand, the aide salary does not even compare favorably with the beginning salary in a large efficient factory (ave. about \$1.85 - \$2.00 per hour, ref. a sampling of employers).

It is often stated that Progress for Providence personnel that higher wages are paid to attract better personnel. That these salaries are paid is proven in Table 1 (which also indicates why professionals and clerical workers find a home at Progress for Providence which they are reluctant to leave). They also however, have stated obligation (primary by the way) to help the poor. The following discussed how they help the poor in terms of a. salary, b. upgrading within the agency, and c. mobility to jobs in the "establishment".

In this agency dedicated to helping the poor, 60-65% of the employees are poor (Zaidman, 124-125). The total personnel budget including fringe benefits for the coming year from Versanting CAR of OEO funds is \$1,551,020, with an additional \$106,075 drawn from CEP to increase salaries in the Central Staff, or a total personnel budget of \$1,657,102. Of this \$1,601,242, or 66.45% is allocated for professional and skilled clerical salaries, while only \$555,857 or 33.55% is allocated for non-professional salaries (Refunding proposal September 1, 1969 - August 31, 1970). Thus, 60-65% of the employees receive only 33.55% of the payroll.

It is also interesting to note that \$266,598 of the non-professional salaries, or 47.5%, almost one-half ( $\frac{1}{2}$ ), are only part-time, whereas the professionals only the

physicians and 4 nurses, representing an expenditure of \$56,034 or 5.08% of the total professional payroll, are part-time. Also, in contrast with the non-professionals who would normally be unskilled neighborhood residents with no other source of income, these doctors (the nurses only account for \$2,859 of this \$56,034) would be highly skilled, high income persons with other work in private practice.

In addition, in a comparison of past years' budgets with the forthcoming budget, the total personnel costs for the Central Staff were compared with the costs for aides in the Community Schools, one of the original titles created to give new opportunities for poor inner-city residents. Taking changes of personnel titles and shifts of personnel to other budgets as well as percentages of salaries attributed to CEP into account, the amount allocated for Community Schools aides declined by 25% while the Central Staff increased by 16%,

At the same time, the original Community Schools budget called for administration of the program by the School Department. The new budget has an education administration component which totals \$41,239 in supervisory personnel costs alone. This figure excludes such other costs associated with implementing this administration component, such as space costs, equipment, supplies, travel, telephone and other miscellaneous items. At the same time, the salaries of the aides in the community schools have increased from the original 1965-1966 rate of \$1.75 per hour to \$1.85 per hour, for a total increase of 5% in the past four years. In contract, the cost of living has increased 20.2% in those

same four years. At the same time, a professional working in the administration component, should he have worked for four years from a starting salary of, for example, \$7,500, would have received a total percentage increase of 21.5% and would now be earning \$9,116 per year.

While some other aides have not fared so badly, their salaries still do not measure well when compared to the state. While Progress for Providence professional salaries are higher than those paid by the state, the salaries paid to non-professionals are lower. For example, Case or Neighborhood Aides earn \$4,250 per year. The state's new case aides position pays from \$5,460 per year to \$6,474 per year, a difference of between \$1,200 and \$2,200.

A further inquiry into the employment problems of the agency reveal that in a rank order jobs fall only in two categories: highly paid supervisory and poorly paid aides, many of whom work part-time and have their hours cut each year. In this rank order, the professionals fall on one end of the scale and the non-professional poor on the other. In an agency with approximately 440 persons on the OEO payroll, the median salary funded by Versatile CAP or a combination of Versatile CAP and CEP for the same salary is about only \$2,000, but the average salary is \$3,327, \$226 below the federal poverty index of \$3,533 for a family of four. (President's Commission on Income Maintenance) In contrast to the agency as a whole, the average salary for members of the Central Staff, without fringe benefits, is \$8,648. The average had been lower, however,


the fact that Mr. Lachapelle's budgeted salary increased from \$15,00 to \$18,000 this year caused a corollary increase in the already high Central Staff average salary. The average annual salary for working persons in the State of Rhode Island as a whole is \$5,666, more than \$2,000 more than the average salary for Progress for Providence, and more than \$3,000 less than the salaries for the Central Staff. In addition, of the 440 salaried positions in the agency, only eleven fall in the \$5,000 - \$6,000 range of the average salary for the State.

Table 2 below demonstrates in graph form the range of salaries, the numbers of persons receiving these salaries including all personnel, full and part-time. Physicians and part-time nurses are excluded from Table 2, as the Agency is probably not their primary source of income.

Page 23a contains the Salary Range Graph, Table 2.

TABLE 2  
 PROGRESS FOR PROVIDENCE  
 EMPLOYEES' SALARIES PER YEAR

NUMBERS OF EMPLOYEES



SALARY PER YEAR

SOURCE:

O.E.O. REFUNDING APPLICATION, 1969-70

More extensive research into the proposal to OEO for funding of the agency for the coming year reveals that of the approximately 440 persons on the payroll 259 are part-time. Of these part-time personnel, 220 or 84.9% are non-professional neighborhood workers. Only 39 of these part-time employees are professionals, and these are doctors and nurses, who, it might be assumed, do not need the poverty program for a principal source of income.

The contrast is even greater when the number of part-time non-professional positions is compared with the total number of non-professional positions requested in the 1970 grant application. This application cites 276 non-professional positions, for a total non-professional budget before fringe benefits of \$468,705, or an average of \$1,698 per year for each non-professional working. This figure does not provide a true picture, however, since of the 276 non-professional positions, 220 or 79.7% are part-time. Thus, in an agency whose principal objective should be economic opportunity for the poor, and for which OEO funds a total of approximately 440 positions per year, only 65 full-time job opportunities exist for unskilled neighborhood residents.

Finally, it should be noted that the area of greatest controversy in the neighborhoods is the fate of the community schools. This is now more easily understood, since it is there that the majority of non-professional positions exist: at least 138 or more than one-half of the 276 nonprofessional



positions in the agency are in the community schools. The pickings may be slim (ave. \$1.85 hr. for 12-15 hours per week for these 138 positions), nevertheless, these positions are the principal opportunity for the poor in Progress for Providence .

The large number of professional positions which pay high salaries, compared to the low number of non-professional opportunities would lead to a highly competitive situation in which many poor people compete for what seems like a large number of jobs (276), but what in reality is only 65 non-professional jobs for a total inner city population of 90,000 persons. This competition would lead to the type of animosity exhibited in the agency, staff politics and neighborhood competition for funds and job slots for their people.

Also, while the aide positions pay poorly in comparison to state averages, whether on an entry level at \$1.75 per hour or after several years at \$2.11, examination of the budgets and job titles indicate that there is little opportunity for advancement within the agency. There is no evidence that a structured career ladder or lattice exists through which poor persons employed by the agency can plan a career. In each component the rule is a range that goes non stop from Director at \$10,000 - \$12,000 per year, and Specialist at \$8,000 - \$11,500 per year to Aide at \$3,500 - \$4,500 per year. The only exceptions lie in the areas of clerical personnel, who must have skills often not available among poor persons and the nine Staff Assistants. Therefore the only avenue for advancement

of poor people in the agency would seem to be a hop scotch affair which would have little or no relation to skills learned on the previous job.

Testimony given by witnesses at the Council hearings verify this hypothesis, not only among the non-professionals, but among the professionals as well.

C. Mobility within the Agency Structure:

In his original testimony, Mr. Lachapelle stated, "hopefully we can develop new opportunities for non-professionals in this program". (329) If the budget is any criteria, this has not been accomplished to this date. The following will explore the "opportunities" within the agency for advancement, and what the agency does to assist in advancement. The second section, related to this, is how the agency insures advancement or mobility of its personnel into established agencies and institutions.

In the first days of the investigation two conflicting reports concerning agency mobility were described to the Council. Mrs. Irene Teller testified before the committee that she had been employed by Progress for Providence and that this employment helped her move out of the project and better her standard of living. (6) For two years she worked in the drop-in center and supplemented that income with ADC payments. She was given notice that the center would close on Tuesday, and the Friday that followed, she was again out of work. After two years of working in the drop-out center, she stated to the council in response to the question, "Do you now consider yourself trained by the agency so that you could go out and get work?", "No, they asked me when I was screened for the job, to be myself ...I am not trained for anything else, doing what, for instance?" (17 & 19) To the question, "After two years it hasn't trained you for anything other than to work in the poverty program?", she replied "not in that sense, no". (21)

At the same meeting, Mrs. Lillian Gilbody related her experience in a different component of the poverty program: "I started as a parent aide in community school. I am a case aide. I am going to Roger Williams Junior College through Progress for Providence." (1)

This program is a component of Head Start, one of Progress for Providence's few successes.

While Mrs. Teller has received neither training nor upgrading and Mrs. Gilbody is improving herself through Head Start, Alan Skvirsky has demonstrated the considerable mobility of the professionals and their rapid advancement. In question 2 he relates his history with the agency: "My present capacity is Director of Education. I was formerly a Program Developer when I was first employed on May 11, 1966".

Mr. Skvirsky's entry level salary as Program Developer would have been \$8,500 in May, 1966. His salary as Education Director according to the present budget would be \$12,800. This represents an increase of \$4,300 over the past three and one half years, or more in salary increases than the average poor person employed as an aide by Progress for Providence earns per year. None of these salary increases represent increases in professional skills in one particular speciality over the three and one half year period described, since each job title was in a different department of the agency.

Mr. Skvirsky was aware of the lack of mobility among the aides. In question 105, he was asked, "...how many (parents) are employed for their second or third year in the program?"

He replied that "...I would say that probably a good percentage of the people who are in the program two years ago are still in the program. I might say that that is a failure, in a way, but the failure is a two-sided failure. It is a failure to provide meaningful employment outside of the confines of Progress for Providence, but also a failure on the part of institutions that should accept such people and they don't, and don't create meaningful kinds of jobs that credit them with experience'.

The discussion continued:

Q. 106 "That is my fear, that often a program like this becomes dead-end, and that these people don't move out and leave an opportunity for people to follow.'

A. "I heartily agree. That is a great danger."

Mr. Lanigan further defined the problem of employment in Progress for Providence, especially in terms of mobility both within the agency and outward mobility to private employment. "...this is one of the big problems, you see the same faces, the same people. The only thing that happens, they leave one job category to advance to another. But never out of the agency into jobs that are meaningful. (That's the) the name of the game, private employment.' (13) Mr. Lanigan suggested that "...new people (should be) brought in and certain length of time attached to training, say as a neighborhood aide, and they get six months or a year of training, at the end of the year, you are out into private employment, or somewhere else to give someone else a chance. Rotate the people. I suggested this a

long time ago". (15)

The problem of training for its personnel has never been approached on any widespread basis by Progress for Providence. The agency had a Training Director at one time, but he had no budget to work with to provide college or certificate courses, and to hire consultants to devise specialized curricula to respond to poverty population needs as they re-enter the job market, and, for that matter, a newly created job market. New Careers has only been in existence for about 3 years. Even now the Agency has a training component in their in their new grant application, but again, it is purely professional personnel: a Director of Personnel and Training at \$12,200 and a Training Specialist at \$10,100.

Miss McNeil's testimony demonstrates the type of training offered to inner-city residents in the past: "...in the Progress for Providence program, they did have a program which they called the sensitivity program. That was financed by Progress for Providence...and there was at the time John Kenower, the training director. They held this training system (the sensitivity session) and he was questioned about it. His answer was that the sessions were sometimes brutal and loud. (207)

Investigation indicates that this training was to make persons working in poverty areas empathize with poor persons. However, there is no indication that it helped any poor people advance in their own jobs or to find jobs in private employment.

Miss McNeil commented on the performance and mobility

of the women working in the education program: "As I say, I think we have fine people in our area working in the program. I think they try to do the best they possibly can. The only fault I have that these good women were not given the chance to better themselves. The program started out first, and I believe the parent aides were getting about 20 hours a week. I could stand correction on that. Every time there was a slice in the program, the poor people took the cut, not the high bracket, the high brass. That has been my call and my gripe since the program started.

"There are many people in my program... They are fine people and do good jobs. If they could only get better positions and more chance of advancement, I would be very happy." (241)

Q. 242 "In other words, you would say the central staff and the higher-ups of P. for P. have enriched themselves at the expense of the people attempting to get off welfare?"

A. "Definitely, there are people in my center (who) have a fairly good education, nice appearance, perfect ladies, and over the years they have not been advanced one iota. They are still in the same category as when they started, unless the pay increase of 5 per cent, whatever it has been..."

Q. 243 "They received about a 5 per cent pay increase?"

A. "Yes, whatever the raise was."

Q. 244 "That was about 7 cents an hour?"

A. "Yes..."

Q. 245 "This was 5 per cent across the board?"

A. "Yes, and they were cut down from when the program

started, I could bear correction, I think it was 20 hours when it started. I think it is down to 10 or 12 now. They are the ones that suffered. Every time the budget was lowered or cut, it was the people in the low bracket of pay that were cut out."

In addition to the discrepancy between professional and nonprofessional salary scales and increments, Miss McNeil also divulged the fact that part-time poor working in the community school program do not receive the same fringe benefits as the rest of the agency.

From the testimony thus far, advancement seems limited to the opportunists, most of whom were professionals. Additional testimony furnished in later hearings further defined the methods of advancement in the agency.

There were several references in the testimony to the "Acting Director" situation. What in fact this was, and the testimony will back this up, was a mechanism through which a professional would operate a program which appealed to him usually with a higher salary, until a qualified person could be found to fill the spot. Under normal circumstances, one of two things happened: the job would never be advertised and the person would slide into it, or the job would be advertised and he would get it on the basis of having experience on the job and an appeal to be loyal to the agency's own employees.

The lengthy testimony by Turchetta and Connell demonstrates this mechanism perfectly, illustrating how the "paper cutter" became Administrative Assistant. (Turchetta 18, 19 -24, Connell, entire testimony) This last illuminates the whole pro-



cedure in detail. In line 27 Connell agrees that this procedure is normal in the agency, and in 31 and 33 he agrees that "acting" personnel usually get the jobs, seemingly magnifying the hypocrisy of Mr. Lachapelle's "reviewing applications all day". (18)

The other example is Q- 8- Turchetta: "Then we have Alan Skvirsky, Director of Education. The job wasn't even advertised. Mr. Skvirsky was Acting Director of Education for several months before he became director. In his testimony he related his experience in education "How many years of classroom experience have you had?"

The Witness: "Two." (p. 167)

An example of the difficulties involved in upward mobility in the agency was related in the testimony of Mr. Joseph Tomasso. In a series of questions (16-31), Mr. Tomasso describes the difficulties encountered by Miss Susanne Shaw in her attempt to move up one grade in the employment ladder. While she is highly spoken of, and "helped our community write a few proposals and also has been a lot of help in the communities" (16), her application was in difficulty. Mr. Tomasso read a letter from Dr. Malbandian, Director of Research and Evaluation into the record in which he resigns effective upon Miss Shaw's advancement: "To the Personnel Committee: If Miss Susan Shaw is hired as principal planner social planner for planning group, please accept my resignation effective as regular notice of resignation. This letter was signed by Myron K. Malbandian. (18)

In further testimony, Mr. Tomasso indicated that he

was "under the understanding that Dr. Nalbandian had one person put one (application) in, and that is the person that is likely to get the job". (25)

At the close of Mr. Tomasso's testimony, Dr. Nalbandian came forward to discuss the question of Miss Shaw's application. On page 377 & 378 of the record he describes the situation:

"A position became open with the resignation of a former planner. I said to Mr. Lachapelle, and a few people in personnel, that I would screen the applications which were involved. Miss Shaw, whom I do not denigrate is a good worker. She has a virtue of defect, like all of us, and the defect is her virtue. She informed me she would like to apply for the position.

"I had another applicant whom I had taught, who wrote the program for me. He is a VISTA worker. He is a graduate of Williams College, and has a degree in economics, and a year in graduate work, and has been a VISTA worker for a year. I am not interested particularly in his ethnics or his frame of reference. I think that the fact that he had come to Providence to be a VISTA worker says something for him. He writes very well. He has the qualifications. This involves some importance.

"I reviewed his qualifications,...and I said to Miss Shaw, ...'Don't waste your time applying for the position. You are employed in a position where I think you are functional. You do well. You get a decent salary.

"Now in fact instead of advertising this position at \$10,500 a year, which is what the previous person who held it was

paid. I said, 'I will advertise it at \$8,500 a year'. There are only two applications for this position to my knowledge." (p.377-378)

Dr. Nalbandian then reiterated that he felt that he should have the sole right to hire his staff, and that he would resign should Miss Shaw be upgraded to the vacant position. (P.378-390)

An inquiry into this testimony reveals that Miss Shaw had worked for the agency as Social Planner for eight months at an annual salary of \$7,500. She had also participated in the summer work-study program (to employ disadvantaged college students who exhibit talent and financial need in public agencies), the previous summer in Progress for Providence, working in the planning department. It was on the basis of her performance in that capacity that she was hired by the agency upon completion of her college education. Both she and her family are Providence residents. She had been trained by her immediate supervisor, the past Planning Director, Jane Mayerson, and she had recommended that Miss Shaw apply for the job as the most experienced and qualified person available, and one who had worked on past program proposals and had knowledge of the agency based on working there. She had highly recommended Miss Shaw for the position, and felt it a natural advancement on a career ladder. In addition, Miss Shaw had extensive support in the neighborhoods.

The other candidate, Mr. Gordon Allen, did have excellent academic credentials. He had worked in VISTA and had cooperated with Dr. Nalbandian in preparing a Credit Union proposal. He came from Syracuse, N. Y. and has an M.A. There is no evidence that he had other experience in planning.

Miss Shaw has since left the agency. Mr. Allen is still working in VISTA. The position was filled by Mr. George Piperopoulos, a Greek citizen, who has just completed his studies in Europe.

Mr. Tomasso also told the circumstances under which a young lady was hired as Assistant to the Director of Education. "This young lady who has the job never put in an application. The time limit was up and gone." (31)..-"At the time this was brought up, I happened to be the Chairman of Federal Hill Advisory Committee. A black woman applied for this job, and a white applied for the job, both capable of handling it. There was a negotiation. The whites were fighting for the fellow and the blacks fighting for the woman. They put in a substitute." (35)

This substitute had been working for the agency in the Head Start program. Her beginning salary in 1966 was \$5,000 per year. and with this raise in 1968, her salary became \$9,000 per year. She is a college graduate, with no other experience outside of that gained in her two and one-half years in the agency.

While there is little evidence of upward mobility of non-professional personnel in the agency, at least one instance of reverse, downward mobility was cited by Mr. Tomasso:

"...one of our people, that we felt should go to work in community schools. She was one of the legal aides and lost her job on the spur of the moment. We had this job open for quite a while. We asked her if she would like the job, and if she could do it. She said she could.

"They screened her, okayed her, and sent her papers. I took her her papers up to the central office. When I got there, I couldn't find any of the directors, or assistant, or anybody. In fact, I spoke to his secretary. This went on for three days." (1)

The woman was finally put to work. However, the salary for legal aides was \$2.00 per hour for 35 hours per week, while that of parent aides is \$1.75-1.85 per hour for 10-12 hours per week. There is no indication in the testimony or elsewhere that this woman had been trained for employment commensurate with her previous salary, especially for employment in the legal field in which she had worked in the agency.

Other examples of upgrading within the Agency structure are Mr. John Long and Mr. J. Webb Mangum. In the course of the investigation, it became obvious through examination of personnel records that most of the upgrading in the agency has occurred in the manpower component. At least five examples of upward mobility in this component can be documented.

In Mr. Mangum's testimony, he stated as part of his background: "I was a member of the Soul Patrol at the time when the disturbance was in South Providence. I was a project coordinator for Success Insurance Program for Progress for Providence. I was also a field supervisor for the Outreach and Progress for Providence." (6) Mr. Mangum is now Deputy Director of the Concentrated Employment Program, the Progress for Providence Manpower component. While his beginning salary was \$7,000 in 1967, he now earns \$10,500.

The testimony cites several examples of upward mobility in the Agency, but only one example of mobility from the status

of non-professional aide to a better position, and even that was merely a part-time aide becoming full-time. The professionals have been extremely mobile, and have advanced into positions that were not advertised through the mechanism of "Acting Director". Some people have advanced in direct opposition to the wishes of the screening committees and the neighborhood residents who are supposed to be served. Others, showing proper credentials, have been by-passed through personal wishes on the part of superiors.

There is no organized training to help people advance in the agency, and, for that matter, to find jobs in the private sector. While the agency has employed a Training Director, and has presently expanded its budget to include two persons to work in training, they have never allocated funds for the more formalized training needed by the non-professionals if they are ever to advance. Sensitivity training is no alternative for college courses and high school equivalency, or, for that matter, direct and simple training in job skills.

One example was given of backward mobility. This example is a condemnation of the Progress for Providence Manpower Program. According to Mr. Lachapelle's testimony, the Manpower Program has a Vocational Counselor for each neighborhood. The entire program is funded for \$2.087 million annually, yet there is no counselling and job placement for the unfortunate poor who are phased out of jobs in the Agency's own structure. In other words, rather than placing her as a part-time parent aide at a huge salary cut, the phased out legal aide should have been placed in private employment by the agency. This would have provided her with secure good paying employment, and would offer an entry level job to some other person who does not have any skills.

Two comments in the testimony have bearing on the above discussion and conclusions: one was by Mr. Mangum in discussing the jobs available in industry and their appeal to the poor and the other by Mr. Gifford in his commentary on the troubles of the agency. In describing the Success Insurance Program, Mr. Mangum stated, in part, that "the program, as it was designed, would prove nothing because the jobs that were available were menial in nature, and that to prove something under this would not be valid...(to) prove the things they set out to prove (these factors would be necessary): that jobs with potential, and the opportunity to advance, according to the individual's ability, (should be) made available, (so) that the retention rate of hard core unemployed would be higher." (33)

While the aide jobs do allow the employee the freedom and status associated with white collar work, the work is basic and a look at the budgets and their lists of job titles demonstrates that these jobs are low-paying and that opportunity to advance is complicated and difficult. Since there is little counselling or testing before an aide is placed on the job (Mrs. Teller, 13 14, how she got her job), the opportunity to advance on the basis of ability is at best a chance affair. Too often employment is based, as in the case of Mrs. Teller or the woman on Federal Hill, on what happens to be open at the time of need for a job, any job.

Mr. Gifford in his testimony states that "We have the pressures from the agency itself. We have the built in politics among the staff, which is natural in any agency, but in our

agency I think it is more prevalent than most." (p.111) A study of the testimony in these sections on hiring and advancement practices might provide some indication of how and why these political pressures have evolved. In an agency whose major thrust according to its legislative title is to be economic opportunity, and which has little in its activities to implement this goal besides initial hiring of the poor in low paying jobs, it seems almost natural that jungle in-fighting might evolve to take advantage of the better jobs that might exist. This infighting becomes even more understandable given the behavior of the professional staff, which has resorted to advancing itself outside of its own professed procedures.

Thus, the picture is one of tokenism in jobs for the poor, with correspondingly higher salaries for professionals, low levels of salary for poor persons coupled with little opportunity for advancement within the agency, while the professionals advance at a rate not common in established private agencies. The results of all this are increasing levels of frustration and a credibility gap that will be hard to overcome.

The next section, Outward Mobility, reinforces this reasoning.



D. Outward Mobility from Jobs within the Agency to the Establishment:

While the newspapers have documented the departure of professionals from the staff in the past several months, the principal interest of a poverty program might properly be the mobility of the poor who are hired and, supposedly, trained, in its programs for more secure employment and economic opportunity in the private sector. Testimony in the records reinforce this opinion concerning the priority of the goal of outward mobility. That some employees were not trained and therefore were reduced to waiting for other jobs to open or to taking lesser jobs because they needed the money has been documented in the previous section. This section will deal with the staff's and neighborhood's recognition of the need for training and mobility and what has actually occurred. In his testimony, Mr. Gifford recognized the friction and pressures of the staff and correctly attributed it to the politics of the job. He also mentioned earlier in the testimony that there was pressure to open the CEP program "...by way of expectation of its staff members, that were going to get certain jobs within the program". (p. 116) This is probably attributable to the lack of outward mobility, as described first by Mr. Skvirsky "...very often a program like this becomes dead-end, and that these people (the aides) don't move out and leave an opportunity for people to follow". (106) Miss McNeil agrees in her testimony that this is indeed true. (241)

Mr. Lanigan sums up the goal: "...it was never intended for these people to be hired, brought into Progress for Providence, and allowed to flop in the job until the program phases out". (12) This comment reflects the fears of many that if the program is suddenly not funded, many people will be unemployed and back on welfare. Mr. Lanigan discussed the Progress for Providence system of hiring many persons for one job, the rationale

behind that system, how it can be abused and offers a suggestion for a change in the system:

"...he (Mr. Goldberg) said in his law office there was one secretary for maybe three or four lawyers. Here there was a discussion at this meeting as to whether they should have two or three for one lawyer. Of course, again, you can't really criticize that. This is putting neighborhood people to work. There is a fine line you have to draw here. If you criticize this, as I have at the meeting, the poor will come back at you and criticize you because you are trying to take jobs away from them.

"Really and truly they are not needed. This is a good thing for New Careers where these aides can be trained. I know attorneys all over the state will be happy to get trained people..." (42)

"...this is one of the big problems, you see the same faces, the same people. They leave one job category to advance to another. But never out of the agency into jobs that are meaningful. The name of the game, private employment." (13)

He recommends that "...new people (should be) brought in and a certain length of time attached to training, say as a neighborhood aide, and they get six months or a year of training, at the end of the year, you are out into private employment, or somewhere else, and give someone else a chance. Rotate the people. I suggested this a long time ago." (15)

From the lack of further references to this type of system in the testimony, it appears that this is not done. Since there are references to lack of training, it can be assumed that unskilled people would be forced to remain in these dead-end jobs for lack of skills to advance outwardly. It is known that the School Department hires teacher aides and the State Department of Social Welfare case aides, but it is nowhere mentioned how

many, if any, of these people have previous experience working for Progress for Providence. Thus, one of the most important questions remains unanswered: what does happen to all these people (60-65% of the Progress for Providence staff), if federal funds are cut off?

New Careers was designed to provide training and jobs for disadvantaged persons in public and private institutions. It was the intent of the program to get people to work in these institutions and the federal government would pay for their salaries and training costs during the first year while they learned their jobs. After that they were to become permanent employees of the contracting agency. It is not known how many New Careers enrollees had previous experience with Progress for Providence. However, if recruiting had been properly accomplished, it would follow that aides would take advantage of this opportunity. Both Mr. Lachapelle and Mr. Skvirsky speak of "new opportunities" for aides, but neither apparently seems to think of New Careers as this opportunity. Once again, the Progress for Providence aide is considered "taken care of". As in the entire Progress for Providence manpower effort, they direct their efforts to the population outside the Agency, to the neglect of those whom they hire. They thus shirk one of their major responsibilities in more or less chalking off their own employees and not insisting that they be given the advantages of counselling, testing, training and placement that are given to the rest of the community.

One of the reasons for this lack of outward mobility can be cited in the lack of job comparabilities. There are only two main categories of jobs in the State employment that compare to Progress for Providence nonprofessional positions. Most school departments are beginning to hire teacher aides, and the State has its two classifications, Youth Advisor

and Case Aide. Again, it seems unknown how many ex-aides from Progress for Providence fill these jobs. However, someone should speculate on why more jobs of this type do not exist, given the New Careers program and the admitted usefulness of the aides. Perhaps Mr. Lanigan has the answer when he states:

"That kind of arrogance we can stand, the arrogance that comes from agencies that know their business, but not from an agency that can't back up anything they have done.

"If the Boys' Club created such a situation as you have mentioned, a beaurocracy of their own, for instance,...they have something to back it up, the experience and training over the years..." (46)

It might be worthwhile to consider the relations Progress for Providence has with other agencies when considering the possibilities the aides have of having new jobs created for them outside of the poverty structure. With this kind of arrogance exhibited by the upstart poverty agency, there can be little optimism that established agencies will extend themselves to work cooperatively with Progress for Providence to create new, untried and innovative job restructuring in the private and public sector.

There might also be an interesting study into the cause and effect relationship between the delegation of education programs to the School Department and the eventual inclusion of aides into their formal structure. By actually having them assigned to their department, the teachers were able to assess the value of the aides with no budgetary considerations to confuse the situation. They then decided that the aides were worthwhile and reacted favorably to the idea of having them full-time in the school system.

E. Termination Procedures:

An examination of the Progress for Providence Personnel Policies indicates a futile attempt to produce nothing. The policies concern themselves with such legitimate areas as the number of permissible sick days, vacation days, fringe benefits, and the like. The establishment of such criteria is indeed laudable; however, nowhere in the policies is there any mention of any grounds for termination of employment. It seems that the Agency relies on the principle of "what the Board giveth, the Board can take away".

It is true that mention is made of a Personnel Committee where grievances may be aired, but nowhere does it explain what grievances, nowhere does it state what shall be grounds for termination, and should such an action be taken, it might only occur at the behest of the Board of Directors. Thus, if such is the case, and one must and can only assume it is from a review of these policies, the Board would be in the position of terminating an individual who would then have the right to present his grievance to a Personnel Committee. Or, otherwise stated, the whole would fire and give the fired the opportunity to appeal to the part in the hope of overturning the whole's decision - an unlikely if not impossible situation.

Actually, if I may be permitted some latitude of interpretation, what undoubtedly was in mind when these policies were drawn up was the fact that everyone knew that in truth and in fact the hiring process was fully in the hands of the Executive Director so it was assumed (but not stated) that he would also control the firing (this was also not stated), and that he would not fire on an arbitrary or capricious ground. Not only was this not stated, but this last has no foundation in any form of reality

judging from the past and present conduct of our current Executive Director.

Thus, the result was that the Agency in doing a half-baked job in originally establishing a meaningless set of policies, bound itself to a useless set of procedures which are little, if any, help in assisting an individual who has incurred the wrath of the Executive Director.

It does not seem that it would have been that onerous a task for the Agency to establish a meaningful and workable set of personnel policies. Precedent and guidelines have been set down by private employers, local communities and the State of Rhode Island; and I am sure that a workable program could have been established after only a cursory examination of these other programs -- that is, unless it was the Agency's intention to allow for such arbitrary action as the Executive Director may direct.

At present, the only grounds for termination are the normal federal prohibitions: nepotism, violations of civil rights, violation of the Hatch Act and certain criminal actions. Thus, it would appear that as long as an employee did not run amuck of one of these prohibitions he must be retained no matter how incompetent he may be. If he be terminated for any other reason, or other grounds, we would be back to our original proposition that the whole would be firing and giving appellate regress to the part; or we would have to resort to our other proposition that just as the Executive Director has proven to have the power to hire, he may also fire on grounds other than stated above and on such grounds as he himself may from time to time determine.

One effective manner through which termination has been effectuated within the Agency has been the "cutting the job" technique. This is accomplished by eliminating an employee who is not wanted by the Executive Director from the federal grant application; in fact to eliminate his

job and title in the budget. While this procedure may effectually rid the Agency of an undesired employee, it draws once again its effectiveness not from efficiency or the needs of the poor, but rather from the discretion of the Executive Director. As an example of this procedure, the position of the Training Director, a seemingly obvious position in an agency where 60-65% of the employees are considered non-professionals and unskilled, was cut from the budget in 1968-1969. Such a technique implies that the job itself, not the employee, was not adequate and of low priority. It also combined with other personnel practices to reduce morale, increase employee politics, and, in general, reduce the efficiency of the entire agency.

III. LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS  
TO THE POOR



### III. LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS BY THE AGENCY TO THE POOR:

or

"The Poor For Whom We Are Advocates"

Gifford, p. 121.

Progress for Providence, as the official anti-poverty program for the City of Providence, should be above all the agency that responds to the daily problems and needs of the poor, incorporating them into an overall plan to combat poverty as it exists in the inner-city target area. However, testimony and research indicate that the proposals do not change from year to year, reflecting the impact of successful projects, that the poor are not really included in planning, evaluation, and decisions on priorities, and that agency staff members are "arrogant," "laugh at" the poor, do not even give them the courtesy of responding to their requests, and use the residents whose poverty pays their salaries to act as stageprops on committees that often do not serve any meaningful role.

A comparison between the programs of the funding years from 1966, when the agency first began to operate at full funding, reveals that there has been little change in programs in the last three to four years in spite of the fact that Mr. Gifford states that "This is a program in which we have to give high priority to imagination and innovation." He uses this objective as an excuse for lack of tidiness: "this program, generally speaking, gentlemen of the council, is not a tidy program." (p. 120) Nevertheless, the programs that were originally proposed and funded are still in existence, in essentially their original form, although with some additional administrative personnel, and fewer nonprofessionals, indicating that a bureaucracy and establishment have evolved and that some degree of tidiness might not be too much to ask. Generally, these programs include community schools, health centers, drop-in centers, detached workers, neighborhood resource units for

social case work, manpower, planning and evaluation, housing (originally Home and Block Improvement, now Housing), Community Organization and Central Staff. Included in the new budget, as a new component, is Economic Development, which shares its funding with the Planning Division. It seems strange, to say the least, that in four years of spending approximately \$5 million per year on these nine neighborhoods that their needs have changed so little: economic development, the one new program, represents only a total of \$60,673 of federal money, leaving the remainder of the grant for programs that have been operating for years. An inquiry into reasons for this lack of change other than the reason of total disregard for neighborhood demands and priorities will be included in the section entitled "Planning & Evaluation."

Various testimony demonstrates the degree of participation by the poor in the setting of program priorities, planning and evaluation undertaken by the Agency.

In some of the most controversial testimony in the hearings, several persons, both volunteers and staff of the program discussed some of the problems of the Emergency Food and Medical program. The subject was introduced during the testimony of Mr. Alan Skvirsky, Director of Education. It was brought to light that there was a sizable fund of money (\$18,000) which was reserved to provide food for children in the Community Schools' summer program. For many reasons, only \$3,600 of this money was spent. "It has been suggested, for (snacks). . . that there are many children at the Fogarty School. . . who might be able to benefit (by) an evening supper program, but nothing has been done about that." He also mentions that the program might "try to identify the children (who are) not only undernourished, but who need medical care also."

(91)

Mr. Lanigan had some suggestions for use of the Emergency Food and

Medical money in his testimony: ". . . nurses and nurses aides. . . could make the decision on who is eligible for this type of emergency food. . . work with the doctor, and determine, yes, this family is suffering from malnutrition. . . the doctor could observe that, and treat them directly through the use of funds through the medical health center." (30)

Miss McNeil believed that "There must be many hungry children in the area. . . when this program first started, I tried to bring to the point that in this program they should have hot breakfasts for the children, because I believe many of the children go to school without food in their stomachs. I believe that if they had food in their stomachs. . . they (would be) more happy and content, they would learn more. . . I tried to work for the hot breakfasts, but it didn't materialize." (206, 207)

Further testimony, which will be cited in the section "Poor Communication," indicates that very few persons in the neighborhoods were aware of this program, although apparently those who were both knew of cases of malnutrition and had ideas on how to spend the money. However, the program was both poorly advertised and poorly administered, with suggestions from persons who did know about it ignored. Thus, it finished its funding year with a lag of approximately \$46,000 in unexpended funds, much of which could have been used to help alleviate the symptoms of poverty in the inner-city neighborhoods of Providence.

The poor also have suggestions that should have been considered in setting priorities in planning and funding programs. In every instance where it is mentioned, the Health Program was universally praised, yet every witness testified that it was underfunded. Mr. George Olsson stated that ". . . (the health clinics are) very good, (but) they can use more money, as everyone has said." (16) Mr. Tomasso was most lengthy in describing the problems of the health clinics: "Now last week. . . we had a meeting of staff assistants,

chairmen and Dr. Kerrins (Director of Health) at the Medical Center. They led us to believe the medical centers would close unless we give help of a hundred thousand dollars. At this meeting Cleo Lachapelle was sitting in. They recommended we get outside monies from outside sources. . . it was very critical that they would close.

"Yesterday we found out that we got close to \$148,000 lag money (unexpended funds), and no necessity for the chairmen and everybody else to go out and demonstrate, so forth and so on, because the monies were there." (43)

These statements have led the members of the committee to ask several questions: If this is one of the most successful programs by neighborhood standards, why did it not have enough money to operate for more than seven months of the funding year? Why was no financial emphasis placed on it? Why were there more than enough unexpended funds to continue the program for the remainder of the year, yet the staff assistants and chairmen were encouraged to "go out and demonstrate" to get more money for the ailing program? Finally, if the poverty program in general is so successful that all components should be refunded each year, why is there unexpended lag money, indicating that the programs are not fully utilized as budgeted? All of these answers seem to hinge on the inquiry contained in the section on "Planning and Evaluation," and the section entitled and discussing "'Sloppy' Administration."

Mr. Gifford proudly described his staff as "Advocates" for the Poor. (See Section title, also ref. p. 121). As such they should be open to listening to the poor at all times, being sympathetic to them and to their problems, and should be prepared to risk themselves for the benefit of the poverty community. The testimony regarding the actual behavior of the staff, taken in light of this mandate, is at best not professional. In the following quotations, representatives of the poor describe the staff as "arrogant," "laughing at them" and

ignoring their requests, thus denying them one of the most basic rights, human dignity. Theoretically, the dignity of the individual, especially one living in poverty, should be a major concern of Progress for Providence; practically, it seems about as highly valued and relevant as the screening committee for the CEP. This behavior, as much as the poor personnel procedures, seems to be responsible for the breakdown of faith in the poverty program by the poor, and the increasing "credibility gap."

The screening committee was a good example of how the Agency complies with neighborhood demands. In Mr. Lachapelle's testimony, he describes how the screening committee came into existence:

". . .at the board of directors meeting, where the program was actually passed, it was recommended we set up a screening committee made up of a representative from each target area, plus five appointed by the chairman of the board." (242) "The screening committee was recommended by a member of the neighborhood advisory committee chairmen." (244) This would indicate that the neighborhoods would have control over those appointed to the CEP, since they held a majority of at least nine to five on this committee. Yet the extent of their real power over their own appointees is documented in what actually happened: Mr. John Long had already been chosen director of CEP months before he ever applied. Mr. Webb Mangum was appointed by Mr. Lachapelle even though the screening committee rejected him by a vote of six to two. In another action, someone inserted Mr. Harold Jennings' name in an empty jacket of OJT applications, and he was hired. The committee deliberated in "meeting after meeting" (260), yet the actual hiring was done by the director of the agency. It certainly cannot be said in this instance that the staff, and especially Mr. Lachapelle, acted as advocates for the poor, reflecting their desires.

Mr. Turchetta's testimony describes the unfortunate position of the

poor on committees, such as the executive committee of Progress for Providence, where Mr. Mangum and others were finally hired:

"... You turn to Cleo and say, 'This fellow is fair, and he has a Master's Degree, and works such-and-such a place,' and Mr. Lachapelle says, 'This fellow was recommended to me by John Long and Webb Mangum' and the rest of his cronies. There are three of us on the board against 16, we can't out-vote them." (41)

"You believe that the poor are inadequately represented?"

"That is right, all the way down." (42)

"How often are you voted down?"

"Every time we go to vote. I haven't won a vote yet--excuse me, we won the vote at the last committee meeting, three to one. Seth Gifford almost went into a state of shock. Dr. Kolodney made a motion to table it fourteen days. I seconded the motion, and Dr. Kolodney said a show of hands, myself, Dr. Kolodney and Mr. Williams. Seth Gifford got up and said, 'All opposed,' and just his hand went up. He couldn't understand it. He asked for a second count." (47)

The poor also find themselves in unfortunate positions when they make requests of agency staff members. Mr. Lanigan, an unemployed inner-city resident, requested consideration for employment in the agency and had to wait for information on his application for six weeks, after which he was told his application would be kept "on file in the event we can use this experience and background in another position." Almost two years later Mr. Lanigan was still seeking employment in the agency, and was told he would have an interview in a week. Four months later he still had no interview. (2)

Miss McNeil states that "I have been trying to voice my opinion in the program. I believe I haven't been getting any place with the complaints." (204)

". . . I ask questions for information, and the other evening I asked a question, and I got an answer. But I didn't get a satisfactory answer. . . I was told by the chairman of the board. . . one question at a time. I want to know how you can get an answer if a person gives you an answer and you don't understand, aren't you entitled to ask further in order to get your viewpoint cleared up?

"I am so sick and tired of hearing this same expression, maximum feasible neighborhood participation. I represent the poor in South Providence. I come asking questions concerning the program." (p. 282)

It seems Miss McNeil has the right to represent the poor, but no right to understand what it is she represents them on, and no right either to question the staff or to receive answers to those questions.

Mr. Joseph Fryer's case is an interesting one. He states that he is enrolled in the CEP and for the last six weeks preceding his testimony he attended classes. One of his major topics of study was "How to make out employment cards, how to file that; how to file for a job." (130) Yet Mr. Fryer has "put in applications repeatedly. . . (and was) told every time that (he) asked about it, I am 60, I am over the hill." (6) While the agency has passed judgment on the gentleman's employability because of his age, they continue to waste his time and the taxpayer's money equally casually by training him in how to apply for a job. His main benefit for attending the classes is that he made \$25.20 per week on relief; he now gets \$47 per week as his CEP training allowance. (46) In addition, the CEP orientation course, in which Mr. Fryer was enrolled, was supposed to hold trainees for a maximum of four to six weeks for testing and counselling before placement in formalized occupational training or directly on a job. Since the CEP staff have seemed to have passed unfavorably on Mr. Fryer's vocational future, it can only be concluded that Mr. Fryer

became to them nothing more than a cipher, a CEP statistic, designed to demonstrate the success of the program by keeping the number of enrollees in the Fraser Center up to federal requirements, while violating the terms as dictated in the funding of the grant in keeping him in "employment orientation" for months, with no hope of every achieving a job.

Witnesses also testified to what they considered the "arrogance" of the staff. In addition to Miss McNeil's problems in finding answers to her questions at meetings of the Board of Directors, other testimony, even that of the staff, seems to confirm this "arrogance."

In regard to the screening for CEP for example, Mr. Lachapelle felt no compunction in overturning the work of the screening committee and appointing Mr. Mangum, stating that "in my judgment I feel he is well qualified to do this job." (290) He also takes credit for Marathon House, which has never been funded or administered by Progress for Providence, saying that "Marathon House, which was set up initially by Progress for Providence. . . (is) one of the outstanding programs in the country. . ." (349)

Mr. Gifford offers advice to the upcoming officers of the poverty program: "We have got to play it absolutely above-board, be fair, listen to all factions, seek to be objective but without losing sight of the fact that we are advocates of the poor. We must move towards our goals, but in this advocacy, I think that we have got to be mature, and we have got to stay objective. It has been my afford as chairman of the board to not place one group above another, but to try to respect the points of view of all the groups, to give an opportunity to each within the framework of the goals and guidelines of the agency." (118-119) These are high ideals, but unfortunately they have not been practiced by the staff, and research proved that the objectives and opportunities did not even exist.



Mr. Alan Skvirsky, who testified next in the hearings, was a prime target of neighborhood discontent. In spite of this, he had no difficulty advancing in the agency, going from \$8,500 per year to \$12,800 per year in the latest budget. Mr. Skvirsky claims to be an "Advocate" but admits that "it is natural to be concerned about one-self's own interests . . . ." (108) However, he says, ". . . if the time came when the poor. . . no longer felt that I, in my position, with my salary, was being their advocate. . . they could get rid of me, and if that was the case, so be it." (112)

In spite of Mr. Skvirsky's stated modus operandum that he would resign if no longer wanted by the poor community he seemed not to blanch at the slurs cast at him by his constituency. Mr. Skvirsky is among several of the top staff who received a vote of "no confidence" by the neighborhood residents who testified. Miss McNeil describes the elementary program operated under his direction as "disgusting" to her. In one session she attended, she "never in (her) life saw such bedlam. In fact, when I happened to be up there, the rescue squad and police came in. The kids had beat each other up. That is my experience with the community school." (240)

She was also critical of the attendance, especially in the adult classes. She cites one individual who wanted to take courses for a high school equivalency but couldn't because the attendance was so low that no class was held. Even in the elementary classes, she states that "the attendance was in no way comparable to the attendance that I was given to understand was at the school." (237)

While the Education Administration component is responsible for the employment and training of aides, and their welfare while employed by the program and their advancement once in other jobs (if and when this happens), two problems were cited to demonstrate a lack of concern: Miss McNeil stated that aides

received only a 5% increase in salary over four years (while Mr. Skvirsky's salary increased 66% over his original rate), and that they did not receive the same benefits as the rest of the agency, including major medical insurance and pensions. In addition, Mr. George revealed that the aides, once employed in the regular school system were denied admittance in the Teachers' Union.

(17) Apparently no one in Progress for Providence assisted them in their fight for this membership privilege.

It remained only for Mr. Tomasso to document Mr. Skvirsky's real concern for the poor. His description of a meeting of the Neighborhood Advisory Committee Chairmen is a stereotype of all the grievances of the poor against the Central Staff:

". . . This meeting was in regards to community schools. While this was going on, Alan Skvirsky and Carol McCarthy were sent to Atlanta, Georgia. The chairmen couldn't ask any questions. When we did ask him, we couldn't get any replies from Cleo Lachapelle.

"These community schools have been more or less working from day to day, you might say. . . Alan Skvirsky was given a budget to figure out how much each community should have and how many people and teachers, and how many schools are running in the areas. What he did with this budget is what a nine year old kid would do, put it on a table and cut it in nine pieces, . . . and said, (If you need any more money) 'go to another community and see if you can have it. If they okay it, you will get it.' This is the director talking about the neighborhoods. . . (he) never went around to the schools to find out how many people attended the schools, how many schools were open, how much work was being done in the schools. He just didn't care."

"The chairmen all got together and at a board meeting we asked for his

resignation. He laughed at us. When he got up to explain the proposal to us, he had a thousand dollar raise in his pay in the budget, after telling us we were short a hundred thousand dollars, which later he got." (6-16)

This is the same Mr. Skvirsky who earlier said in sworn testimony, ". . . if the time came when the poor. . . no longer felt that I, in my position with my salary, was being their advocate, that they would get rid of me, and if that was the case, so be it." (112) The Neighborhood Advisory Committee Chairmen are supposedly the elected representatives of the poor, who voice the feelings of all the poor in the nine target area poverty neighborhoods of Providence. If they are not the poor who would "get rid of" Mr. Skvirsky, then who would? No one on the staff made a move to fire him. From the personnel policies, also, it would seem that there is no accountability by the staff to the poor, or anyone else for that matter. There just is no way to "get rid of" an unresponsive advocate, even by the poor, in their own agency.

Mr. Skvirsky was out of town with his assistant in Atlanta, Georgia during this meeting. In his absence, the Neighborhood Advisory Committee Chairmen were informed that the program needed \$100,000 to operate fully. At the same time, the Agency was negotiating with the School Department on the contract under which they would operate the community schools. The schools would not open until this contract was complete. Nevertheless, the Director of Education and Community Schools Supervisor, both highly paid and supposedly highly dedicated, went out of town together for one or two weeks and delayed that program, preventing thousands of poverty level children and their parents from realizing its benefits. That this actually occurred is attested by Mrs. Faith Schacht of Fox Point, who said, ". . . the community school. . . was very slow getting started. We felt we did not get the help we needed from the director and the education director. They didn't get together with the school

department in time. Everything was laid slide. They kind of put the responsibility to us. We weren't really qualified to take over. We were quite disturbed about this at the time." (8) Because of this delay, the community schools operated with an \$80,000 lag in unexpended funds until the date of the hearing. (Tomasso, 13)

This new agency, the poverty program, was established because the old institutions for the poor were unresponsive and unsympathetic to the needs of those who relied upon them. It was supposed to be sympathetic to the needs of those who relied upon them. It was supposed to be sympathetic and gain the trust of those who had been exploited by the establishment in the past and make an impact upon those established institutions making them more responsive to the needs of their clientele. It is to be hoped that the agency's staff, many of whom remained unmentioned and unsung in the testimony, do fulfill these duties, offering inspiration and education to the poor they served. Nevertheless, the hearings brought out the failings of the staff most visible and most capable of creating a crisis of unbelief and unrest, the Central Staff. Mr. Lanigan sums up the feelings of many of the poor, who feel that they have had enough arrogance in established agencies without creating one more in their midst, when he says "As it stands now, I believe Progress for Providence, their operation and some of their personnel, are arrogant, not only towards the poor, but also towards other agencies. They claim it is good to be arrogant with the State Department of Social Welfare and criticize them and get them to change. Their arrogance goes beyond this. It goes into areas of just common ordinary dealings between the people and other agencies, other federal and state and city agencies." (43)

These then, are the "Advocates of the Poor" as described by witnesses at the City Council hearings: arrogant, unresponsive, bad mannered, and not above using their constituents to advance themselves into higher positions.

Given the malaise concerning the hiring and employment practices and this kind of arrogance, unresponsiveness and lack of responsibility to the very poor they purport to serve, it comes as small wonder that the complaints became vociferous enough to cause a Council investigation into the treatment of ordinary Providence citizens under an agency which uses millions of taxpayer dollars.

#### IV. POOR COMMUNICATION

POOR COMMUNICATION:

In addition to being unresponsive to the needs and wishes of the poor, and with the exception of its reliance on outreach workers and one edition of the news letter, the agency has made no attempt to inform residents of what it was doing and what was available to them in the form of services and opportunities for employment.

In spite of the fact that Progress for Providence had a funded position of Public Information Officer, the quantity of work produced by his office verifies one resident's report that "he cuts newspapers". (Turchetta ,25) While the agency was supposed to have a newsletter or newspaper, and Mr. Connel was hired to oversee that activity, only one newspaper was ever printed. This appeared in late summer of 1967, and was edited by Mr. William McNamara, then Executive Director. Emanating from the Public information office no flyers or distributions have appeared in the neighborhoods. Radio and television coverage has been limited to news, and there is no evidence from either of these media that Progress for Providence took advantage of their public services announcements. There have been no telephone campaigns to inform residents of the opportunities available to them through the agency. There is also no evidence of any coordination of the activities of the Public Information Office and the Neighborhood Aides who canvass the neighborhoods daily to inform residents of the agency's services.

While many examples of breakdown of communications were cited in the testimony, the failure of the Emergency Food and Medical Services Program to attract any recipients most fully delineated the problem. While the agency staff struggled to find ways to expend the funds, neighborhood residents who might have needed and used this money remained unaware of its existence.

"How is the emergency food program in your area, would you determine it is a success?"

"I think it would have been a big success if someone had known about it. No one in the area -- the poor people -- didn't know about it. I think staff and certain members of Progress for Providence knew about the \$50,000 funding they got for it.

"...I found out about it reading the amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act which I secured from State OEO." (Lanigan, 23)

In his testimony, Mr. Robert Bailey, Chairman of the Camp Neighborhood Advisory Committee, further emphasized the lack of communications and information about the programs in the neighborhoods.

"How about the food program in your area, how did it work?"...

"First I really had good knowledge of that was when Dr. Nalbandian testified. The only thing I ever heard was lack of funds, lack of funds." (19, 20)



"You feel as though there is need of more funds in your area for emergency food?"

Without a doubt. We had a case Monday, or Friday of last week. I understand the thing was shut off December 31st. I didn't know about it. I found out Friday when I took a young man up to see the social worker in our area." (21)

It seems elemental that at a very minimum the Chairmen of the elected Neighborhood Advisory Committees should be made aware of all programs, since they do represent the residents of the neighborhoods served by the program. However, this testimony makes it evident that these chairmen, and, it would follow, all members of their committees, remain uninformed about basic anti-poverty program approaches.

Mr. Olsson, from the Joslin Committee confirms Mr. Bailey's report and proves that it was not only the Camp neighborhood which was unaware of the Emergency Food and Medical Program.

"....any other comments?"

"Yes, you mentioned earlier...the emergency food program. ...Evidently the social workers have known about this, but have not told the welfare people or anyone else about it. There is very little known in the Joslin area that it was even in existence. Someone said here tonight that it was stopped. These social workers deal with the clients, and knew about this. There is one in our resource unit and no information came out." (22)

Mr. Chester George was the chairman of the Flynn

Neighborhood Advisory Committee. Yet he did not realize that Emergency Food money might have helped the Health Clinic program which he states should be extended.

In spite of this kind of poor public information, Mr. Connell received a raise and was advanced i<sup>n</sup> position from Public Information Officer to Administrative Assistant, not necessarily because he was the best of all applicants, but through the device of being made "Acting", implying the confidence of the Executive Director that he had done a good job in the past, and would continue to perform in the same manner in a better and more influential position.

Poor communications exist not only between the staff and the neighborhoods; this condition seems not unusual within the staff itself. If anyone should be intimately aware of the agency and all its programmatic details, it should be the person to whom the staff assigns the role of chief evaluator, the Director of Research and Evaluation. Yet his testimony makes it obvious that he lacks some of the most basic information concerning the agency and its activities (page 78, this report). In addition, Mr. Zaidman also seems unaware of some of the programmatic details of the agency. If this is true of these two persons, it might follow that Progress for Providence is essentially a group of insulated programs which do not interact except to share the OEO Versatile CAP funding, and that no real coordination or weighing of program priorities can occur.

## V. PLANNING AND EVALUATION

## V. PLANNING AND EVALUATION

The keys to successful demonstration programs are the quality of planning and evaluation, the quality of the personnel implementing the plans, and the future planning that is done based on objective and subjective evaluations of these demonstration projects. The quality of the top staff which directed the projects has been discussed in the previous section, in which witnesses reported their own experiences with that staff. This section will provide indications of the quality of planning and evaluation in Progress for Providence by relating the testimony and research that evolved during the course of the hearings. If the poverty agency was funded to demonstrate new ways of reaching the poor "where they are", as is so often stated in the colloquial, and for overcoming their multifaceted problems, it should be necessary to evaluate successes and failures before continuing the "war on poverty" each year. Both the testimony and the grant applications for the four years of its operation indicate that Mr. Gifford's "high priority to imagination and innovation" did not actually take place within the program and that evaluations were few and took place only after programs were firmly entrenched.

Progress for Providence began its planning operation with a tremendous amount of research accomplished, which was inherited from the agency's predecessor, the Youth Progress Board. This, combined with many meetings to determine the neighborhoods' desires and needs in programs resulted in a first year program that was fairly comprehensive and was easy

to build on for future projects. However, once the original evaluation was completed and programs were designed based on it, there was no further evaluation, with the exception of one informal subjective evaluation of the community schools until summer of 1968, three years after the original grant and the opening of the program. In addition, planning, which had been based on reasonably reliable data combined with neighborhood reports and feelings seems to have been reduced to "planning in a closet". Later proposals show no indication that they rely on evaluation and/or community desire. They are mainly simply efforts to continue what was already begun, with no judgment on the effectiveness of the effort. (see pages 49 & 50, council report, listing the programs funded during the past three years by O.E.O.) The following testimony verified these research findings: little or no major evaluation was undertaken, planning responded to the agency and regional O.E.O. not the neighborhood requests, and figures and statistics reported by the agency may not be worth the paper they are printed on due to human error or lack of research or both. Thus the experiment continues with neither changes in plans nor objective reports to predict its outcome in terms of improvement in the everyday fate of poor people.

If the structure had been followed and OEO guidelines kept to the letter of the law, no planning would have taken place without evaluation and maximum feasible participation of the poor in all phases. From the declaration of need, to setting of program priorities, to actual program design, the poor should have

had a voice in their own programs. Testimony indicates that this was not the case, at least in the immediate past.

A look at the structure of the Agency shows that maximum feasible participation of the poor in the planning process is, at best, a difficult task. The agency has a board of directors, and nine neighborhood advisory committees, based on geography (census tracts). In addition, each advisory committee has several sub-committees, based on problem areas. Thus, in order to plan any one program, the Planning Department, which consisted of one person, would have to have had meetings with at least nine committees, most of whom had vested interests in getting the most for their neighborhoods. Considering that a plan would require votes on the need, priority, outline, plan and budget, each proposal would necessitate 45 meetings of sub-committees, plus nine meetings of advisory committees, plus one meeting of the entire board of directors. It is understandable that this kind of planning came to an end at the end of the first year and "planning in a closet" became the rule rather than the exception with plans presented to the board of directors after their completion.

In addition, once unemployed persons were placed in jobs they were reticent to relinquish these jobs to other new plans and projects. This conjecture might explain the fact that in four years, Progress for Providence, despite its claim to "imagination and innovation" planned only one major group of programs, which it then continued to fund year after year.

A description of the planning process engaged in by the

(refunding proposal, 1969-70). If these figures adequately reflect past practices, then the Department of Research and Evaluation should have averaged about \$100,000 per year for the three years of its operation, for a total of \$300,000. For this sum of money, the Department, at the end of two-and-a-half years, had produced three complete evaluations, or \$100,000 per evaluation. Dr. Nalbandian described the quality of these evaluations in his own words:

Community Schools Evaluations:

"Did you finally evaluate it (the Community Schools)?"

"That is an open question." (19)

"I would like an answer."

"We published a community school evaluation, which I am prepared to defend for what it pretends to represent." (20)...

"...I am not sure that (it) is a definitive evaluation of the program." (21)

"What type of characterization would you characterize it as?"

"A significant actual beginning, a first pilot evaluation, and one which I would like to have stricter control." (22)

"That evaluation took your department 2 ½ years?"

"It took one \$5,500 staff member three months' work, and my own participation..." (23)

Dr. Nalbandian, on being asked if he had accomplished any other evaluation reports, then said, "Up until the last eight months, our shop was very poorly defined..." (32) If this

was the case, it took him almost two years to organize the statistical section to the point where any work could be done.

However, two other reports were introduced into evidence:

Head Start Evaluation:

"How would you characterize that evaluation report, Doctor, is that a beginning or a good one?"

"That is probably technically as good as any Head Start evaluation...I am prepared to defend that statement. It lacked a certain control. I think the shop spent \$1,500. We had to buy the test for 10 cents each..." (35)

"Did your evaluation report praise the Head Start program?"

"It neither praised nor condemned. As I said, we didn't have the type of controls in testing, pre imposed testing, that would permit us to make definitive statements that this one program is better than the other..." (36)

Since these children are in a Progress for Providence program, and had been enrolled since the previous September, and also, that this program had been in existence since 1965, it seems strange to say the least that no controls had been designed, and even more strange that there was no pre-testing of children as they entered the program. This is evidence of poor academic discipline in the evaluation department, and little advance planning as to what will be tested and the needs involved in that testing.

The third evaluation compiled by the Evaluation Department in those 2½ years was on the program New Careers. As part of his testimony it becomes obvious that he does not know some



of the most basic facts about the poverty agency which he is to evaluate; for example, in response to the question, when did the funding end for the New Careers?", he answers, "That ended sometime in June...It didn't coincide with our funding year -- or maybe it did, I don't know." (64) However, an evaluation was completed and a copy of this evaluation placed on file with the Council. The following discussion summarizes the findings of the evaluation of New Careers.

"As a result of the large expenditure of time on your part in evaluating the New Careers program, could you characterize the New Careers Program as a successful program?"

"It depends on the criteria you use it is probably as good as most."...It is a model program, and maybe it isn't as successful....It is probably comparable to most New Careers Programs' on the other hand, if we did it again, I would say it is a bad program." (42,43)

"Would you recommend that New Careers be re-funded?"

"Yes, under the present design, and not to the original design." (44)

Based upon this evaluation, New Careers is again a functioning component of Progress for Providence.

For someone who fills the role of Director of Planning, Research and Evaluation, Dr. Nalbandian exhibits surprisingly little personal knowledge of the program. While he says that it is his responsibility to evaluate programs and help determine their future in terms of priorities and repeat funding. (7,8,9), he does not have such basic information at hand as the funding years for different programs (64), whether or not

Success Insurance was refunded (it was refunded but Dr. Nalbandian says "I am not familiar with it." (96)), he has no idea of how food stamps are distributed ("the district nurse has a handful of food stamps, the neighborhood aide has some..." -126),---food stamps are distributed on a very strict basis, since they are the same as money in a market), and he does not even know how people are appointed and hired for the agency ("...are the hiring procedures designed for the screening committee to screen applicants and recommend who is to be hired?" "I simply don't know." --p.380). Finally, in the testimony that will be quoted in the following discussion, Dr. Nalbandian states that he wrote a program based on his assessment of community need entitled "Expanded Emergency Food and Medical Program" which doubled the request for funding of a program that had previously experienced a lag of 92% of its funds unexpended at the close of its program year. While claiming no awareness that there had ever been an Emergency Food and Medical Program in the past, Dr. Nalbandian took it upon himself to judge the quality of that program.

Re. Emergency Food and Medical Program:

"Did you write the original?"

"No, the first time I saw that was in Washington..."(102)

"Did you supply the statistical data, or who wrote the program?"

"I don't know." (104

"Did you supply any statistical data for that program?"

"I really don't remember. I certainly didn't do any

serious statistical analysis of it..." (105)

"(yet)...you said to the Board of Directors...'There is no question at all we have a problem of undernourishment.'"

"I said that, yes." (106)

"Do you have available...any figures on the number ...who are undernourished?"

"...No, but I could do the routine. There is no question at all that the problem does in fact exist." (107, 108)

"You tell this committee there is no question we have undernourishment in the City of Providence...However, only \$3,600 (of the grant) was spent?"

"I heard that tonight." (110-111)

"Do you have any idea to what extent the problem exists in Providence...?"

"I think we could spend a hundred thousand dollars in four months feeding undernourished children and families. No question at all in my mind, it is a very expensive problem." (113)

"Would you say the administration of that emergency food grant was lax or improper? How would you evaluate that?"

"I think 'lax' is a good word, if you have to use an adjective." (116)

"Don't use my adjective, use your own how would you characterize it?"

"Sloppy." (117)

"...In this new proposal that you have just written, asking for emergency food and medical services, did you take into account the program last summer?"

"I said I didn't see it until after the program was written..." (118)

"You disavow any knowledge of it?"

"I didn't know anything about it." (119)...I just don't know anything about it. We have some internal problems which we are in the process of solving." (120)

If the previous program was "sloppy", and Dr. Nalbandian did not evaluate it and its mistakes before writing his "Expanded Food and Medical Program" (the very title implies he must have had some knowledge that there was a predecessor), the new work program he outlines for the expanded program seems even "sloppier". Aside from the fact that he has not evaluated data on need, (although he could "do the routine"), he designed a program with no controls:

"You were quoted: 'Anyone that says he is hungry gets food for up to one week.' is that correct?"

"Yes." (124) "...they (resource unit workers) will say, 'Have you got a family?' If a man is a bum on his own, we are not talking about that kind of person" "...someone comes in over to the resource district nurse, and says, I'm hungry. We have no food in the house.' The district nurse has a handful of food stamps, the neighborhood aide has some, and she says, 'Wait a minute here, go down, and we made arrangements with this market or that one, to go, and if you can't go, stick around, I will get you food. What do you need? I will get it for you.' They will come to the neighborhood. Then we bring you into the system..." (126)

Aside from the fact that there is no nurse in the resource unit, and the only nurses are located in the health clinics, Dr. Nalbandian, who should be concerned with quality and control of programs, makes no mention of forms or intake procedure during this initial contact which might help him in his future search for statistics on the problem. He even admits that the program might give food to persons who are "phony" (129), and who might take the hand-out but seems unconcerned about this possibility which might be controlled by a few sterner measures before giving out food vouchers and food stamps.

"...even if they do (cheat), so what, I think the results are worth the risk that we take." (131)

He also has no definition of undernourished and has not taken the precaution of including questions in the health form concerning malnutrition.

"...under your proposal, what is the definition of undernourished, when is one determined to be undernourished?"

"I don't know. I would assume the health plan physician ..."(137)

"Do you figure this has to be a medical determination?"

"Yes." (138)

"Do you currently utilize the health services in the neighborhoods to determine the extent of undernourishment or malnutrition?"

"No, they don't report that." (140)

The saga of the Emergency Food and Medical Program, as narrated by Dr. Nalbandian and Miss Mayerson, the two persons most directly responsible for program planning in the agency, might be

an example of the way in which the agency plans its attack on poverty. First, someone from regional calls to say that there is money. Then the planners go to work to find out what programs the agency has need additional funds, whether to expand or to fill gaps formed by O.E.O. cutbacks (research indicates that this was the origin of the C.E.P. program also--there were cuts and short funding in Manpower, so the planning team applied for another grant to continue the project), and apply for a grant. This grant is based on need, whether the need established three or four years ago which has never since been evaluated, or on fantasy figures. The money arrives, but there is no effort to improve the system: months after the program begins, there is evidence of "sloppy" administration, unexpended funds and no real evaluation of whether the need ever really existed, or, if indeed it did, whether the program has had any positive effect is alleviating the problem. At the end of the funding year, presumably again because funds are available, with no hard statistics, only the planner's unsupported feeling that an even greater need now exists. "There is no question at all we have a problem of undernourishment"-Nalbandian, (106) the agency again applies for the same grant, this time for twice the amount. Once again funds are granted and the cycle goes on.-

The implications of this kind of blind attack on poverty are basic to the program as a whole. If projects are planned based not on hard statistics proving local need, but a regional telephone call offering a grant, and if there is no evaluation comparing the degree and kind problem that might exist and the impact of the agency's program to attack, then the whole thrust of the poverty program might be mistaken and \$51/2 million is

being wasted every year. If on the other hand, some successful approaches are unrecognized, then programs might take the wrong direction and miss an opportunity to make a significant impact in improving the general economic condition of the City of Providence.

The Agency claims that large part of the efforts of its heavily funded Research and Evaluation Department is directed to data collection. If this is so, then the agency should have, as Dr. Nalbandian claims "the best data bank in the human resources field." (27) and there should be no proposal based on guess-work, in which "... we can't know the real extent of the problem." Nalbandian, (133). Progress for Providence has had grants from O.E.O. in the past for internal management and control. The reports emanating from this system, which took 2 1/2 years to develop and refine, and of which Dr. Nalbandian is so proud, are supposed to provide basic information to the agency for use in evaluating, changing, expanding, or discontinuing programs. However, many of the questions presently asked are too basic, and the urgency seems to have only demographic information on its clients, such as neighborhood, sex, race, educational level, employment status (employed, unemployed, retired, etc.), whether the client is on aid and type of aid, marital status, broad category of client problem, estimated income per year, and the position of the person doing the interviewing. In the health contact sheet, for example, there is no space for a coded system to record medical history, such past problems as lack of pre-natal care resulting in prematurity, still birth, or physical or mental

defects. There is not even any indication of whether this is a first or follow-up visit. There is also no place for comment on whether the problem is immediate or chronic, or whether the patient is disabled and the degree of his disability. There is not even any indication of where a professional or other person seeking to assist the client might turn for a medical history: discussion of previous medical treatment and by whom the treatment was administered is completely left out of the form. Finally, as is the case in every form reviewed by the committee, there is no provision for what happened to the client -- in the case of the health clinic form, we know if he was referred to another source of assistance, but what, if anything, happened once the interview was complete is left unanswered.

The Manpower Counselor Contact Record is just as useless to anyone seeking to provide informed assistance to a poor person in the "poverty system." Like the other forms, it asks only basic demographic questions, such as name, neighborhood, age, sex, race, education, and present employment and marital status. Employment related questions such as "job interests" are covered only in the most broad terms, as an open-ended question, with no code attached relating to categories of employment possibilities. As a result, it becomes virtually impossible to match skills and interests with jobs or training, and, should the "right" job become available for an individual poor person, a counsellor who does not know the individual personally would be unable to find him to place him in the job.

In addition to the fact that these forms are useless in assisting in the placement process unless the counselor and the client know each other personally they are also useless in compiling any area wide study of manpower and employment in the inner-city of Providence. Since questions such as "job interests" a



"skills" are not coded, researchers cannot compare inner-city skills with the job market in the Rhode Island area. Without a coding of "interests" in combination with "skills" and the job market in the area, one cannot make decisions on what kinds of training to institute in the manpower program. Since there is no question at all on what kinds of jobs inner-city residents may have held in the past, the Agency cannot even speculate on causes of unemployment in the target area. Finally, follow-up information is limited only to where the counselor sent the client, so it cannot be discovered from the form whether the placement and the Agency's supportive services were a success or failure in terms of how long the placement lasted or what kinds of successes or failures the client achieved on the job or in training.

The system itself has problems. While every form asks for the same basic information, there is not one form which asks whether the client has a basic form already recorded. Because of this, there can be no accurate count of how many different people Progress for Providence actually does serve. Since no form for second or follow-up interviews was submitted to the Council, it will have to be assumed that no such form exists and that every visit by a client is treated, record-wise, as an initial visit and a new person enrolled in the system. The implications of this failing in the system are widespread: at a very minimum, it would render the entire reporting system invalid, since no one can tell with ease exactly how many of the people served by the Agency are duplicates and what the

actual number of persons in the "poverty system" is in one year, or for that matter, even one week.

The system is also at fault in its lack of interpretation. In a 41 page report, 39½ pages are devoted to a confusing morass of x's and numbers, and only 1 ½ pages are devoted to an explanation of what this mess is really all about. Even this page and a half does not mention comparisons between numbers of people reached and the entire inner-city population, the numbers in poverty or the numbers reached in the last evaluation period. Percentages computed are limited to blacks and whites, males and females, age groups and welfare recipients. The reader does not even know the percentage of unemployed and working poor who have been contacted, since this valuable index of poverty is left out of the narrative altogether. Finally, to make the entire report completely incomprehensible, the columns containing the numbers of contacts and types of problems are not even totalled, so an evaluator would not even know how many contacts of each type were made in one reporting period. Thus the data collection procedure used by Progress for Providence is an elaborate and highly complicated approach by which to obtain only the most crude and meaningless numbers. With such a weak and feeble system of management, control and reporting of programs, a sophisticated evaluation system cannot possibly be built without resorting to the fine arts of fantasy and illusion.

Given this kind of performance, even if a program director did want to institute change based on statistical evaluation,

he could not do it unless he became his own researcher or hired a social scientist to interpret the information for him. Even that would be fruitless, however, since the system which Dr. Nalbandian is "prepared to defend" (51) and which the Research and Evaluation Department spent 2 ½ years developing, does not even determine how many individual people are served, and whether the program has any effect on them, beyond an initial session of hand-holding and interviewing.

This kind of professional laxity is inexcusable; with a project budget for fiscal 1970 of \$101,019 of O.E.O. money based on an expenditure of \$98,260 last year (Refunding Proposal, 1969-1970) to evaluate \$2,000,000 of O.E.O. grant funds, this is completely intolerable. Dr. Nalbandian finally says "...we have the statistical problem solved...and the system defined...anyone can process it now." (27) Based on the research above, the Council cannot be at all that certain. Even if the problem were solved, apparently no one has taken the time to process it. Evaluation remains one of the Agency's most expensive continuing failures, one which has unfavorable implications for the integrity of the entire "war on poverty" in Providence.

## VI. DUPLICATION

# VI. Duplication of Services and Administrative Waste:

While the war on poverty was to be a new and imaginative attack on the problems of the poor, there is little to indicate any on-going innovation in the programs of Progress for Providence. Although many of these programs may have been innovative at the time of their inception four years ago, other established agencies have now begun to use some of the same approaches in their own projects. This can be considered a success of the program. However, once the established agencies turn to the successful poverty approaches and incorporate them into their own planning, the poverty agency should attempt to implement new ideas. This, it seems, has not been done, and Progress for Providence is now in the position of an agency that duplicates the efforts of other, longer established, better staffed agencies.

Much of this was brought out during the testimony in response to questions phrased by Councilman Pearlman, and many of the witnesses volunteered testimony relating to the problem of duplication of services, which in turn has precipitated a situation in which two agencies and administrations are operating essentially the same and competing programs in an area.

In his initial testimony, Mr. Lachapelle states that "...Unless this is coordinated, it doesn't make sense...This is not a duplicate service, but dealing with many problems we have...The purpose of the unit coordinator is to coordinate so that families are served effectively without the duplication of effort." (346)

The question seems to arise, duplication of whose effort? It has already been ascertained that the agency has no way of finding out how many different individuals are served, and how many visits they have had, and by whom. If this is the case, then avoidance of duplication of effort within the Agency by its own staff would require personal knowledge of each case by all staff members. Given the size of the staff and the numbers of people in the population of the inner-city, this presents logistic problems that are humanly impossible to surmount. Therefore, without a system of cross-reference and easy retrieval of information, which does not seem to exist, it becomes evident that some duplication of effort is bound to occur within Progress for Providence itself.

In addition, there is also evidence of duplication of project effort by the agency. For example, both the C.E.P. program and the Department of Employment Security operate manpower outreach and recruiting programs in the inner-city. The Boy's Clubs and the Recreation Department of the City of Providence both sponsor youth and recreation programs in the inner-city. While Progress for Providence might justify its own on the basis that it purports to offer vocational counseling in its drop-in centers there is no evidence either in the evaluations submitted to the Council (there is no evaluation form at all for the drop-in centers) or in the budgets that a vocational counselor is an integral part of the staff of these centers. Since this information is unavailable, and since the new budgets speak only of "youth development directors" and aides working directly in

centers, it must be assumed that recreation in its simplest form rather than counselling is the primary objective of the drop-in centers. Also they cannot claim to be innovative and different as training grounds for non-professional indigenous workers, since the testimony of Mrs. Teller speaks to the contrary, verifying the fact that if these centers go out of existence the workers will either be unemployed or on welfare again or both.

In one section of the testimony, Mr. Pearlman asked the witness, Mr. Lanigan, for his views on the possibilities and value of delegating the operation of the drop-in centers to existing agencies.

"Do you feel they (the Boys' Club, the Y.M.C.A.) would be more qualified to run a youth program...?"

"Definitely, these people have been trained..." (35)"... I do believe that people like, for instance, Providence Recreation, Jack Cronin, as an instance, has a tremendous program for handling kids and people in the Wanskuck Boys' Club. These are the people that should set it up..." (37)

In delegating this program to another agency, Progress for Providence might effect any institutional changes it seeks, provide legitimate training for neighborhood personnel with a reasonable assurance of permanent employment, reduce administrative costs (the savings in this program alone would be at least \$20,000), and strengthen existing agencies. It therefore seems logical that at a minimum, this entire program, and not simply a section of the personnel, should be delegated to another agency.

and proper contracts and evaluations developed to assure that the program fulfills some well-defined objectives, which in itself would be innovative, since the program has none at this time.

Mr. Pearlman also asked Mr. Lanigan his views concerning the possibility of the Legal Aid Society administering Legal Services, since "the Legal Aid Society is for \$30,000 handling the same caseload that it costs the Neighborhood Legal Service to run at \$300,000." Mr. Lanigan replied that much of this was for salaries, and that as presently operated, this was "...really and truly...not needed. This is a good thing for New Careers where these aides can be trained. I know attorneys all over the state will be happy to get trained people..." (42)

However there is no evidence that this program trains legal aides or secretaries for eventual employment in the private sector. Again, there is no data on the numbers of employees who leave this program and enter private employment. However, it can be assumed that few, if any, would be tempted to resign for employment elsewhere, for in practically all instances the Legal Services secretaries are earning far more than their counterparts employed by private attorneys. This is an instance where it is more beneficial for one to remain "untrained."

The social workers in the Neighborhood Resource Units also represent a duplication of effort, since most social workers spend a great percentage of their time in the field. In spite of this, and also in spite of the fact that the social workers for Progress for Providence perform many of the same services as those working for the State Department of Social



Welfare, the agency has in the past employed two for each neighborhood, one as a Family Case Worker and the other as Neighborhood Resource Unit Coordinator. While these workers are permanently outstationed and serve fewer clients thus presumably providing more service, they may also become a permanent part of this new establishment since their salaries are higher than those offered by the State. This gives them a personal stake in the continuation of the poverty program, and may provide an incentive to them to hope that it will continue, since they cannot duplicate their salaries elsewhere in the state.

Three other problems are also evident in this particular case of duplication of effort. One is that the role of the Neighborhood Resource Unit Coordinator has changed since the inception of the agency. At that time, this person was in charge, literally, of coordinating social agency resources in each neighborhood and serving as a social worker-counselor to residents. With the proliferation of Progress for Providence programs, he has become principally a coordinator of Progress for Providence programs emanating from his office in the neighborhoods. As a result, his skills are no longer relevant to his job description, but in many cases he may continue although he may not be suitable for his new role.

The other problem is that with the advancement of the Resource Unit Coordinator, his duties had to be assumed by someone else. As a result the position of Family Caseworker would have been established. Thus the staff extends itself and becomes more entrenched.

Finally, as the original caseworker became an administrator and the family caseworker position was established, the administration also became larger. Whereas originally the Neighborhood Resource Units were administered by one person, this administration now expanded to include two job titles. Thus, once again, a job that had originally been accomplished by 10 people, now requires 20, and could have been operated by the State Department of Social Welfare and employed 9 persons, is now operated by Progress for Providence and employs 20.

One of the major expenditures in the poverty program is its community schools. This program employs the greatest number of neighborhood people as "parent aides". This is also the program that has had the greatest impact on an existing institution, since "parent aides" or "teacher aides" are included in New Careers training and are now becoming more common in the day school classrooms. This is also one of the few programs that has been delegated by Progress for Providence to another agency. The School Department has had major responsibility for the Community Schools since their inception, and since the program operates "on the inside," so to speak, any successes or failures that it might have would immediately become visible to the institution having the greatest impact upon education in the inner-city community, i.e., the School Department. Because of this, this program could have served as an ideal laboratory for the School Department to try out new ideas and adopt those that seem most promising of success for the entire system. This has been the case with the "parent aides" experiment.

The importance of the delegation of the program can be evaluated, in comparison with a demonstration school program established by Progress for Providence, the Roger Williams Community Center. However, this evaluation will have to be subjective, narrative and informal, since no formal evaluation of the demonstration was ever attempted.

The program was established in the summer and fall of 1966 at which time the community of Lower South Providence decided to break away from the school department and form its own educational component. In this, the community received almost the full dedication of the Director of Education and his two assistants. A demonstration program was designed, and implemented for one year. This program was to be a show piece, and the agency staff believed that school department administrators would come and look at it and make changes in the school system based on what they saw. There is no evidence that anyone ever observed the program, and therefore it follows that the program probably had no effect upon the school department. Even the attendance was poor, as attested by Miss McNeil. "...the attendance was in no way comparable to the attendance that I was given to understand was at the school." (237) (However, there is no reliable data on attendance either.) Since the program was expensive (about \$90,000 for one year), and there was poor attendance, both by the prospective students and by School Department administrators and observers, and, in addition, there was neighborhood pressure to close the school and return to the School Department program, it may be assumed

that this experiment in autonomy was a failure. This failure may be one of the reasons why the Community Schools remain in the hands of the School Department.

However, the fact that the Community Schools are delegated to the School Department has not prevented Progress for Providence from forming a separate administration of its own for them. From a staff in which the Deputy Director and his assistant doubled as watchdogs and technical assistants to the schools in addition to their other duties, with a budget consisting of part of their salaries, the education administration staff has increased to several people and a total budget of \$52,000 for the past year. However, the staff still deludes itself that there is no duplication of effort and administrative waste in funds for unnecessary salaries for professionals. Mr. Skvirsky, Director of Education, stated in his testimony that "...education programs were delegated to the Providence School Department. This was not done by accident. It was done because it was felt we could not operate a parallel system of education." (p.125) He agrees that the School Department has changed, and that this "is what it is really all about, to make the educational system more responsive to the particular needs of poor people." (p.128) Yet no one in the agency can tell why the School System changed, whether it was the force of this expensive administration, the effect of operating the Community Schools on the real administrators, the School Department, or, and this cannot be discounted since there is no data to support any other thesis, whether this change might have naturally evolved in any event, given the large

numbers of federally funded programs with federal guidelines that are now flowing into the School Department directly from the State.

Thus, once again, the agency takes credit for institutional change with no solid evidence that the Providence School Department, State Department of Education and the Federal Government through the influx of Title I, Elementary and Secondary Education Act or simple evolution and changing times has actually caused these changes. While informal opinion supports Progress for Providence's claim to this credit, there nevertheless can never be any true evaluation of what impact the agency actually did have: the data and the system just do not exist, and so the agency continues to pride itself on what it may or may not have done, while the remainder of the community rests in doubt, since there will never be any adequate proof of what exactly transpired.

Finally, in terms of duplication of services and administrative waste, it should be noted that Progress for Providence spends approximately 85% of its budget on salaries (Zaidman, 1980).

Thus, by his own admission Mr. Zaidman indicates that in a program when approximately 5 1/2 million dollars a year is given to Progress for Providence to eradicate poverty within the city, approximately \$5,075,000 dollars is spent for salaries and \$425,000 "trickles" down to the poor. The very definition of "poverty" implies a lack of money yet none of the members of the Central Staff who appeared before the committee seemed at all bashful about accepting their pay-checks, their travel pay,

their vacation pay and their other benefits; nor did any of these people who are the authors of the federal proposal seem in any way squeamish about requesting more and more money for themselves. They criticize the community itself, the board of directors and others for their lack of concern for the poor while at the same time setting themselves up as the champions of the forgotten and down-trodden. Such a position can only lead one to wonder whether the rhetoric and concern of the members of Central Staff is motivated more by a justification of their own economic existence and betterment than out of a true and legitimate concern for their fellow man.

## VII. SLOPPY ADMINISTRATION

"SLOPPY" ADMINISTRATION  
(Nalbandian, 117)

When asked to describe the administration in his own words, Dr. Nalbandian, Director of Research and Evaluation, who should comprehend the problem better than anyone else in the agency, called it "sloppy". That he should make such a statement under oath, is astonishing. However, testimony and research reinforce his judgment. The discussion that follows will be based principally on descriptions of the administration of the agency as provided by witnesses at the hearings.

Mr. Lachapelle sums up the "sloppy" administration in discussing the problems of the institution of the Concentrated Employment Program. While the program was originally funded in June, 1968, Mr. Lachapelle comments that "...the program is now just getting off the ground in terms of a full operation..." This statement was made in December, 1968, six months later. Since the program was written including salaries, supplies and other items for 12 months, this would indicate that the program was delayed six months while the staff and the board of directors tried to exert their influence on the hiring practices. There is no estimate of how much could have been done for the poor during those months had the agency had a strong director who would have made a correct and popular decision and stayed with it on how the hiring should be accomplished. As it was, first the entire staff which had been working in Manpower was to be transferred, then a decision was made that all positions would be advertised and that existing personnel would have to compete for their own jobs (there was no evaluation of their



past performance to act as a guide in deciding independent of a comparison of original applications who should remain, advance or be terminated), that a screening committee would be appointed and would review applications, and finally, the decisions were made solely by the Executive Director on the basis of recommendations by members of the Central Staff who actually performed the review function. Because of this confusion, the hiring of staff, a process which might normally consume a maximum of six weeks to two months actually required six months to complete. At the end of these six months the same man who was originally listed as director of the project on the grant application was appointed and assumed his responsibilities. Thus the agency wasted a full one half year on an effort which resulted in legitimizing a decision which had been made seven or eight months before.

Mr. Skvirsky also testified to the inadequacy of the administration. A grant of more than \$50,000 was received for emergency food and medical services. Yet no one in the agency had full responsibility for this money, and as a result only \$3,600 was spent. He is, in fact, the one director who did spend some of the money, and he does know that he spent it on a caterer, but when asked the name of the caterer, he responded, "I don't know..." (68) Nevertheless he admits responsibility for payment: "Only \$3,600 was spent, you were responsible for paying the \$3,600?" That is right, after I received the bills." (84) Throughout his testimony Mr. Skvirsky bears witness to the fact that his entire administration staff is a duplication

of that paid by the Providence School Department, and that he only assists the school department in its duties.

Dr. Nalbandian is the Director of Research and Evaluation, yet he was unaware of the existence of the Emergency Food and Medical Program. Since his department should most obviously have all information available in the agency, it can only be assumed that the Executive Director has never organized chains of command and lines of communication within Progress for Providence. Even his forms are "sloppy" and reveal that he could not have very meaningful communication with other program directors: for example, although there was a food and medical program, there was no question on the health forms to indicate whether this problem really existed and to what degree it was being overcome by the program. (140-142)

Mr. Lanigan described how applications from poor neighborhood persons can get lost for years, and how appointments and requests for action are overlooked, in spite of the fact that the Executive Director has the assistance of both a secretary and a large professional staff in addition to a full-time Administrative Assistant, who should devote his efforts to such matters. (208-210)

Miss McNeil, a South Providence representative, described several examples of sloppy administration. In one section of the testimony, she mentioned the Roger Williams Food Buying Club:

"...we have in the Roger Williams Housing Project, a buying club...I know there is a director employed by P. for P. who

heads this program. To my knowledge, the store has been closed for about four weeks. I am wondering if that program is a successful program, as the others that I happen to know about." (218)

"...I have brought up at the meeting, not only me, but the committee has brought up, that they would like to have a report. We were told it wasn't compulsory for him to furnish a report to our committee. I am very, very anxious to know what the duties of that club, or that director, is." (219)

The committee investigated the Food Buying Club, and its director, Mr. Joel Osborne. The club was his only responsibility. It was open to receive orders from residents of the housing project early in the week, and dispensed these orders on Friday. Residents outside the project or elsewhere in the neighborhoods were not encouraged to participate. The total weekly hours of operation of the club were estimated at 20 per week. For this Mr. Osborne was paid a substantial yearly salary.

This investigation, when related to Dr. Nalbandian's comment "...even if they do (cheat), so what. I think the results are worth the risk we take", reflect the attitude of the agency's administration: so what, we have 5½ million dollars of taxpayers' money to spend, and even if they (or we) do cheat, so what...

Further in her testimony, Miss McNeil implies that some checks are missing from Progress for Providence.

"...I have been told that there are many checks that have wandered away from P. for P..., but from my information, they

have not been legally signed... (220-222)

"This is similar to the situation in New York?"

"Yes." (224) ...All I can tell you is that I have been told there have been quite a number of checks that have been forged... I believe it is from the central office...if you call the director, he should be able to give you the proper information." (232, 235)

"You feel a great deal of money has been misused by reason of inefficiency and administrative chaos?"

"Yes, I definitely do...I believe the poor could have received more reimbursement from the programs than they have received." (252, 253)

The council has not yet been able to completely ascertain which checks are missing and what amount is involved. This portion of the investigation is still pending.

Mr. Turchetta gave further evidence of the disgust of the neighborhood people with the present administration. He described some of the hard feelings that were engendered by Mr. Gifford's proclamation that "The position (of deputy director) has to go to a black man." This kind of ~~comment~~ comment can only lead to increased politics among the staff, and mistrust of administrative motives in decision-making by the residents of the inner-city. When asked his opinion on the administration of Progress for Providence, Mr. Turchetta echoed many of the comments received by Councilmen which originally triggered the Council investigation

"Do you have any observations on the administration

of Progress for Providence?

"You could have a big change of administration. We should start from the top down. The city should take over the program and start from the top down." (48)

"You have had an opportunity, as being a member of the executive and board of directors and neighborhood advisory committee, to concern yourself with people in the program, people who are being serviced by the program and people on the neighborhood advisory committee: would you say that your opinion is shared by them also, that there needs to be a shake-up in the agency?"

"Definitely, just like they had in the Providence Police Department, a shake up every six months." (49)

Testimony also indicates that performance on the job has no relation to promotion. Mr. Connell, who never fulfilled his most important responsibility, publication of a newsletter and informing the neighborhoods about programs at Progress for Providence, was promoted from Public Information Officer to Administrative Assistant to the Executive Director, indicating that the Director had great confidence in him. What this confidence was based on obviously had nothing to do with achievements on the job. Mr. Skvirsky had no qualms in going to Georgia during the most crucial period of the community school contract negotiations with the School Department, yet he received a \$1,000 raise. Mr. Zaidman, the person most responsible for agency finances, found no problem in writing into the budget a \$1,000 raise for himself, \$400 above the 5% increase he was

entitled to, yet not only is there no evidence that he was ever reprimanded, he even received the raise. If the administration is "sloppy" it also leans heavily on the worst forms of "politics" and "political patronage". While the Executive Director continually cries about "politics" from City Hall in the press, he is also guilty of it himself. Perhaps the "politics" mentioned again and again in the news are simply "agency politics" instituted by the Executive Director himself.

In another area, Dr. Nalbandian admits using his department to perform evaluations for other agencies, while completing only three for his own agency in 2½ years. In the course of his testimony he defends his qualifications by stating, "...I don't have to defend my qualifications to this individual. This committee can feel free, as Mr. Tomasso has said, or implied, that I am not qualified. I have done several studies for the Providence School Department. I have done a study for the Governor's commissions on Vocational Rehabilitation, on Comprehensive Medical Care, and on Model Cities." (p. 375, 376) Perhaps the reason he is so unconcerned by evaluation problems in Progress for Providence is because the Executive Director allows him to perform as he pleases and spend his time writing for other agencies while neglecting his own. In any event, the Executive Director displays tacit agreement (word) in allowing him to continue to write evaluations of others at the expense of Progress for Providence. This can be interpreted in several ways: the Executive Director has no control over his staff the Executive Director is unconcerned about the daily

activities of those on the agency payroll the Executive Director has not made himself aware of the output of his staff the Executive Director is mainly interested in the activities of other agencies and/or, finally, the Executive Director would prefer that there were no evaluation of the agency which he directs. Any or all of these alternatives are a condemnation of the top administration of Progress for Providence.

Some of the most telling testimony in the hearings revolved around the activities of the Concentrated Employment Program. The first section of this report described the confused hiring system that was developed to suit the various pressure groups and how the Executive Director, Mr. Lachapelle, eventually did the hiring himself. What then transpired has led to incredible revelations which have found their way into the front pages of the newspapers and have claimed the attention of every responsible regional and national reviewing agency.

In order to "get the problem off the ground", as seems most important to Progress for Providence staff members, quality of program again became of secondary importance. In this case, "getting the program off the ground" involved finding and renovating a large building which would house both administrative staff and training programs for the unemployed. This building was to be located in the Model Neighborhood, South Providence, in accordance with federal guidelines, which associated the grant with the national model cities program as its manpower component.

Since it required three months or one quarter of the

grant time period to hire a director, and since only limited efforts were made until that time to find or begin to build a suitable building, once the lease for building on Public Street was negotiated it became imperative that renovations proceed as rapidly as possible, for this administrative inefficiency had nearly led to the loss of the grant.

In spite of Mr. Leach's offers of more advantageous terms which would have included renovations, the lease was eventually signed for five years, "\$12,000 for the first year, and \$10,000 for the next four years...a \$52,000 lease". (Lachapelle, 522,523) The original contract for renovations was bid on and won by Raymond Construction Company of Bristol, and for \$2,580 he put the building in workable condition, which meant installation of the west wall plus floor for the second floor, which had to be a new installation of a floor". (525) From the type of renovation described, the building was not at all sound in condition; in fact, it was only assessed at \$20,000 on the City tax rolls and could not have been rented in its present condition without such basic repairs.

However, after this initial bid, which was well within the Department of Labor's allowable costs of \$64,000 for the year for rent and renovation combined, the remainder of the work was simply contracted to Mr. DeLeo of Raymond Construction Co. on a lucrative cost-plus basis. Neither Mr. Long nor Mr. Lachapelle found anything wrong or unusual in this procedure at that time. It was only the outcry from the Council and the press that opened their eyes to the possibilities and the criticisms



that could arise from not putting a federal renovation contract out to bid.

Their appalling naivete, arrogance and confidence in their own judgment, and their belief that a simple apology rates continued confidence from the public is witnessed by their testimony, documented in the following dialogues between Councilmen Caprio and Lynch and Messrs. Long and Lachapelle:

"Who obtained the building permit?"

"The contractor". (Long (617)

"Do you know how much the building permit was for?"

"No." (Long, 618)

"Do you know if the contractor made any revisions of that original estimate?"

"I do not know." (Long, 621)

"Have you ever had any previous experience in any construction work as far as remodeling and redecorating are concerned?" (Caprio)

"We renovated an automobile dealership in a training center. I was not directly involved...once I put the roof on a garage." (Long, 623,625)

"This was your first venture in giving out any contracts or any construction work, is that correct?" (Caprio)

"Yes." (Long, 626)

"Did you seek any professional help other than speaking to Raymond Construction?" (Caprio)

"No." (Long, 627)

On the basis of the experience he gained from helping renovate an automobile shop and putting a roof on a garage, and without professional help or consultation, Mr. Long then expanded his original contract with Raymond Construction Company from \$2,530 to a total renovation fee of \$167,288.36 on a cost-plus basis. However, this did not include the cost of fire-proofing the building with a sprinkler system for an additional \$2,000 (which is still not attached to the water main) and paint for the exterior at \$1,900. These figures also would not cover necessary renovations for the roof of the building. (Long, 503, 672) Thus, simple addition proves that the administration responsible for CEP funds in Providence, given a budget of \$64,000 for rent and renovation for the first action year of the CEP program managed to spend \$185,768.36 on those budget items, or in other terms, almost three times as much as they were authorized to spend, and one-tenth of the entire grant that was supposed to uplift the poor, not improve a derelict building

In another aspect of the same type of administrative and financial irresponsibility that led Dr. Nalbandian to say that it didn't matter if some people cheated the federal government by obtaining emergency food money under false pretences through the Emergency Food and Medical Program, the administration of Progress for Providence seemed unconcerned, or to be kind, unaware, of the possibility of helping the poor by buying the building they improved so greatly for them. As Chester George, Chairman of the Upper South Providence Advisory Committee put it,

"Maybe they are doing something we don't know and (have) some secret weapon, I don't know. As far as visible changes, I can't see it. . . . I am concerned with the fiscal aspects. . . that is the new CEP building.

"One thing that the residents would like to know, that since the

Concentrated Employment Program originally was supposed to concentrate just on South Providence, and if the building goes the way it is going now, who will reap the benefits, the local community group, or someone that doesn't live in the community?

". . . we feel a local group through some way, or legal determination, should get this building." (George, 22, and p. 445, 446)

It is obvious why people ask what is going on. There are no terms in the lease to assure that at the end of five years and a total rent and renovation expenditure of \$225,768.36, or almost one-quarter million of federal money, that this building will go to the poor and not remain in the hands of the present private owner. If this expenditure is to help the poor, it surely must be an oblique secret weapon, as secret as Mr. Lachapelle tries to keep his activities, his proposals and his answers to the Council investigating committee.

While Mr. Long was relatively forthright in discussing the error of his ways, and, it will be seen, was appropriately humble in the face of review and possible reprimand, Mr. Lachapelle's response to review was to attempt to hide the evidence until he could call a lawyer--a somewhat belated move. As Mr. Caprio stated for the record, "Mr. Long was not reluctant at all to have the building repaired or remodeled. . . to expend what he considered to be \$170,000" (508, 509), yet Mr. Lachapelle is very reluctant to divulge the costs and invoices for these expenditures of taxpayers' dollars--why? It required no less than 23 questions and 7 pages of testimony devoted solely to the amount of money expended before Mr. Lachapelle surrendered the invoices to the committee. (528-551, p. 502-509) Also, even after all this testimony, Mr. Lachapelle refused to answer the question directly (which is entirely consistent with Mr. Lachapelle) and merely handed the invoices to Mr. Caprio, who then

personally read the total amount expended to that date into the record. It was only through this agonizing process that the public taxpayer was allowed to see just exactly how much money was spent to renovate a privately owned building in South Providence.

In spite of this, Mr. Lachapelle maintains the aurora that he has nothing to hide: "I want to make it perfectly clear I am not hiding anything." (557) After this performance, Mr. Lanigan's statement that "some of their (Progress for Providence's) personnel, are arrogant, not only towards the poor, but also towards other agencies" (43) comes as an understatement. Mr. Lachapelle, throughout the staff resignation and walk-out and in the press has constantly decried the influence of City Hall and the Agency's investigation by the elected officers of the city in the City Council, yet when questioned, after evading 23 questions, he can still comment that he is "not hiding anything."

The quality of this performance, including spending six months of a twelve month grant in hiring, and renovating a building for six months with an expenditure of one-tenth of the grant with no assurance that the final fruits of the expenditure will go to the poor, is astonishing enough, but the reaction of the administrators is even more astonishing. Mr. Lachapelle seems thoroughly insulted that anyone should question his program. Mr. Long falls on the mercy of the committee and the public, saying: ". . . the agency did not have any clear-cut policy as far as renovation work, putting things out for bids. . . there were all kinds of tensions with getting the program going. I quite frankly did not think about it. . . I had a deadline. . . quite frankly, (the fact that the situation was strange) did not occur to me. I certainly have learned, and if I am ever confronted with a similar situation, I would certainly be more practical." (583, 584)

In response to this answer to his question, Mr. Lynch could only respond, as would the rest of the public, "I hope so." (584)

This is, to say the least, a very expensive on-the-job training program in construction that the public has financed for Mr. Long and Mr. Lachapelle. While this kind of on-the-job training may make both men better equipped for their roles as directors and contractors, one wonders if the citizens of Providence might profit from their having learned their jobs before coming on the public payroll from Syracuse (where incidentally the poverty program went bankrupt) and West Warwick, and whether their own cities of origin might now profit from the experience gained at the expense of Providence residents by participating in a little "outward mobility" from the poverty program back to some other established city or town that might make better use of their newly acquired construction and contracting skills and training. Mr. Gifford spoke of high salaries as a "lure" to talented and experienced persons to come to work in the Providence anti-poverty program; however, this "lure" seems only to have attracted the inexperienced who are either arrogant enough or foolish enough not to recognize their own inexperience, avoid expert assistance and therefore make their own \$200,000 errors.

Any further repetition here of what has already become extensively known would serve little purpose. It seems sufficient to point to the facts that have become public knowledge concerning the absolute wastefulness and overexpenditure of funds involved in the remodeling of the CEP building through the study done by the Providence Evening Bulletin indicating the ineffectualness of the program itself, in order to reach the conclusion that this program has, to this point of time, been an abominable failure. Progress for Providence itself must have been disturbed, since the Agency contracted with an outside consultant to evaluate the problems of the program and the steps which would be necessary to

rectify the situation. This consultant worked for three weeks and was highly paid. The results of her study are printed on pages 115a, 115b, 115c. The report speaks for itself; this committee cannot begin to comment on it. Suffice it to say that apparently this report was so highly regarded by the Executive Director that based on its quality he hired its author as Manpower Coordinator for the Agency at an annual salary of \$14,000. I will draw no conclusions from the report or the Executive Director's subsequent conduct; but rather submit the same to be judged by each reader of this Council report.

At the close of the fiscal year, that is, June 30, 1969, the CEP grant funding year came to an end. As a result and as part of normal procedure, it became necessary for Progress for Providence to resubmit a grant application for refunding for the fiscal year in which we are presently operating. Although the proposal was not forwarded to the Council, or to any other city or state government or agency before it went to the Department of Labor, it was reviewed as part of the research for this grant.

This proposal is of approximately the same sophomoric quality as the consultant's report. Although the original CEP proposal for funding included a Planning, Research and Evaluation team of four persons and a total payroll including fringe benefits of almost \$32,000 per year, they were able to turn out only one page of supporting statistics for their request for \$2,000,000 for the coming year. In effect, what this page with its two meager tables say, is, these were our goals and we met them. The remainder of the background information in support of the application is a laundry list of woes of the program and reasons why it would never happen again. What they fail to realize is that we will not let it happen again if only the Department of Labor will continue to give the Agency \$2,000,000 each operating year. The people who wrote the

## Progress for Providence

CONSULTANT'S REPORT ON C.E.P.M E M O

TO: Cleo E. Lachapelle  
Executive Director

FROM: Jennie R. Brown  
Consultant - Critical Paths-

DATE: July 3, 1969

SUBJ: EVALUATION AND FINDINGS OF CEP, PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND

The following are the findings upon a brief evaluation of the Concentrated Employment Program beginning June 13, 1969:

1. STAFF

A) ADMINISTRATIVE

- 1) no cohesiveness
- 2) poor organization
- 3) one component not informed what the other is doing
- 4) not properly oriented as to the full duties of their position
- 5) not given the authority to function in assigned capacity
- 6) program extremely top heavy with directors and assistant directors (all chief and no Indians)
- 7) many directors of components not capable of doing their job because of lack of education, experience, inability to supervise; unable to communicate with their staff; no knowledge as to how to delegate authority; in ability (sic.) to take the initiative in teamwork; follow though (sic.) tactfully and respect to the suggestions of others
- 8) middle management showing:
  - a) no respect for the top management
  - b) not realistic (while making selective suggestions to him in trying to change his basic habits, attitudes and tendencies).
  - c) not being practical in understanding their boss or supervisor, his likes or dislikes, standards, strengths and weaknesses.

- d) no courteous, respective or cordial
- e) permitting the attitude they have to their boss to affect the excellence of work performance.

#### B) INSTRUCTIONAL STAFF

- 1) no loyalty to supervisor
- 2) no respect for authority
- 3) not capable of functioning as instructors because of:
  - a) their attitude
  - b) attendance
  - c) inability to motivate and stimulate enrollees
  - d) poor knowledge of subject matter
  - e) no knowledge as to how to plan and prepare their work
  - f) no knowledge of effective teaching methods and good work habits
  - g) poor classroom management
- 4) no initiative

- C) NON PROFESSIONALS  
Cannot adequately evaluate at this time

#### II. PROGRAM (EDUCATIONAL)

Poorly constructed

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1) The organizational chart be revised to insure better lines of communication and supervision.
- 2) Method of component reporting be changed from monthly to weekly
- 3) In service managerial training be offered IMMEDIATELY.
- 4) In-service training for instructors IMMEDIATELY.
- 5) In-service training for non-professional staff IMMEDIATELY.
- 6) CEP Director be given the authority to function as a director and not as a puppet; that he have the authority to hire and fire competent and incompetent people without being subjected to unwarranted pressures; (sic.) permitted to run program without gross interference; mandatory that CEP Director evaluate all administrative staff in areas of attitudes, conscientiousness and attitudes and be allowed to make changes he deems necessary with full support of the Executive Director of PFP and the Board of Directors.



- 7) That the concurrence of neighborhood advisory council on the hiring of staff be abolished to insure the hiring of competent staff.
- 8) That there be a complete revision of duties and staff at the top echelon of CFP to insure good administration.
- 9) The projected personnel changes be carefully reviewed so that to take into consideration the complexities of the CFP program.
- 10) That the Staff Training component be completely abolished and initiate a Personnel Department with a personnel officer and one clerk or secretary."

proposal do have some idea of what constitutes research; they list all its basic components. However, they experience no embarrassment at having used not one of these indices in monitoring their own program. In addition, they are unaware of the faults of the Research Department of their parent agency: by way of improving their future performance, they promise that CEP research will now become a part of Progress for Providence and that "the two year experience of this Division with the Management Information System of O.E.O. will be very useful in this context. (Refunding Proposal for Concentrated Employment Program, p. 12g). The Council would hope that the staff from CEP would learn, among other things, to total their columns, to make comparisons, and to compute percentages, and not simply to compile more extensive, expensive and meaningless numbers to add to the millions that Progress for Providence has compiled in the last 2½ years of operating this Management Improvement System.

Finally, although they had numerous problems, most listed in the proposal for refunding, and although there was enormous administrative waste in the renovation of the building, no follow-up to indicate the success or failure of their placements, unexpended funds of almost half the original budget, several investigations of their activities and misuse of federal funds, "sloppy" administration and no program control, Mr. Lachapelle, the supreme self-seeker, sees fit to turn all these problems to his own advantage by arguing that the program will improve next year if he and his central staff all receive raises, based on funds granted from the Department of Labor, his raise alone amounting to \$3,000.00. Thus, once again, the professionals, not the poor, receive the fruits of federal money: more than \$200,000 of CEP money for the coming year is proposed, not for salaries and training for the poor, or even, for that matter, for a building in their neighborhood, but for higher salaries for Mr. Lachapelle and his friends at Progress for Providence. (Refunding Proposal, 1969-1970) The best improve-

ment that anyone could possibly make is, quite simply, the removal of Mr.

During April 1969 the entire top administrative staff of Progress for Providence resigned in order to obtain several demands from the Board of Directors. The demands they made and research into both their validity and the outcome of having these demands concurred with results in several conclusions.

The staff demanded that the Agency payroll be transferred from City Hall to its own offices. The rationale behind this demand was that having pay checks reading "City of Providence" was damaging both to the City and to the Agency. Several staff members indicated that the Agency suffered because while it claimed independence from the political structure the pay checks were visible evidence in the neighborhoods that the City did have influence. On the other hand, the reputation of the City suffered, as many of the agency employees were considered at best "unreliable" by such establishment persons as bankers, and that they would have a reduced opinion of City Government because these "unreliable" persons were on the City payroll. As a result, as a symbol of its independence, the Agency would remove the payroll from the City and be responsible for that aspect of fiscal affairs itself.

Previously testimony regarding the misuse of CEP funds form a basis for understanding the position of the City in its attempts to keep the payroll in City Hall. However, the discussion then becomes academic: although the Board agreed to the staff's demand, the payroll remained in City Hall. When asked why this was so, a staff member commented wanly, "We don't have the capability to operate it. . .".

Another demand was that the Board of Directors take a more active role in the day-to-day activities of the Agency. While the Board finally also

concluded with this by accepting the staff back to work in their previous positions, this is in fact an impossibility, and makes the Board an administrative rather than a policy making and review group. If the Board, a volunteer group who serve without pay, are brought more fully into the activities of the administration, they at least deserve to be compensated for their time. It seems unrealistic at best to expect people who probably have many other commitments to give more of their time for free when agency personnel who should be performing administrative functions are receiving high salaries.

The picture presented in this section is of a highly paid, but definitely "sloppy" administrative group, who are unconcerned by misuse of funds, poor job performance, high salaries for little work, agency "politics," unless they themselves are involved, poor hiring and training practices, lack of responsiveness to the poor and their problems, lack of communication both between themselves and the neighborhoods and with each other, lack of evaluation of programs in order to define priorities, and who finally, when faced with the pressure of accountability to the public through the instrument of the press and a City Council investigation, relies on a scapegoat, its own Board of Directors, to save itself. In so doing it raised a question that was almost resolved in the negative by the Board of Directors: are they worth saving?

## VIII. ALTERNATIVES

### VIII. Alternatives

Under the Green Amendment, so called, the City Council has been delegated the responsibility of designating the agency to administer the poverty funds in this community. This amendment has been attacked as giving too great political control to the administration of poverty monies. It is not the intention of this committee, nor I am sure is it the intention of the City Council to any way render political what was and is intended to be an effective governmental attack on those conditions within our society which prevent and hamper individuals from pursuing a better life for themselves and their families. It is patently obvious that a new expenditure of money, by and of itself is a waste of funds as well as an exercise in futility. Yet, from what has been brought out at our hearing and summarized in the proceeding pages it appears that not much more has been accomplished by our local poverty program.

Proceeding from this proposition what recourses are left open to the City Council?

1) We could refuse to designate any agency, thereby losing 5 1/2 million dollars of federal funds which would be left to be expended in other communities. However, to do this would be a disservice to our community as well as a discredit to ourselves as community leaders.

2) We could continue to designate Progress for Providence and admonish them to seek means to be more efficient - an admonishment which seemingly would be of little practical effect judging from the past conduct of the current agency hierarchy.

3) We, could set up a separate agency of our city government to administer the poverty funds. However, such a course without attempting some other alternatives would most certainly brandish our action political.. We would be characterize as patronage seekers and non-responsive to the need of the poor+thus perhaps tainting the effectiveness of the program itself. Therefore, this alternative, it seems ~~it~~ should be <sup>pursued</sup> ~~pressured~~ only after all other avenues have been traveled and found wanting.

4) We could create a city agency whose primary responsibility would be to work with any and all private organizations who concern themselves with helping the less fortunate within our community. Once again, however, our action would be attacked as being political. While this tact would not be as vulnerable as that mentioned in number 3 alone; those, so called advocates of the poor who do not subject themselves to the approval of those they seek to serve while retaining the benefits of their service would criticize our action.

Therefore, we urge that the adoption of the following procedure in designating any agency to become the "advocate of the poor" in this community.

Let every agency or group within our community, interested in upgrading the plight of the poor in the Providence area submit their proposals to us as a council, at all times taking into consideration federal guidelines, the laws of the State of Rhode Island and ordinances of our city. Let them present their ideas for future action for our consideration. Let every interested group public, quasi public, or private give us the

benefit of their thinking. Let us not hastily pre-judge Progress for Providence, but let us extend to them the opportunity to demonstrate their concern and ability to meet that concern by submitting their proposal to be judged in meritorious competition with others asserting that they can do a better job. Then, after due deliberation and consideration let us designate the best possible program that will help us eliminate poverty in this community.

In the interim let us continue to exist under the current system with the admonishment that we will no longer tolerate the sloppy administration of the past; and that should the P for P proposal to this body be deemed by this council not to be as good as may be submitted by another submitting agency, that the other group and not Progress for Providence will be so designated. Let us further, admonish, that, if for any legitimate reason none of the proposals submitted to us are deemed sufficient, that we will have no other alternative than to follow the procedures previously enumerated in #3 and #4 of this section; to do otherwise would be to shrink from our duty no matter what the charge or cry rendered by the discontent.



## IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The following should be considered in conjunction with what has been said in the previous sections, and is offered for the assistance of the current agency as well as any aspiring designate.

### 1. Establish Set Hiring Practices and Follow Them Strictly

In a program which is dedicated to improving economic status of a low income group, a higher wage, and a better job are two immediately visible signs that life itself may improve drastically in the future. The current agency offers opportunities for some selected persons who may not have equal opportunities elsewhere in the labor market, such as the unskilled and persons with criminal records. As a result, these persons look with hope to the future and for better employment to the one most visible source: the poverty agency.

Because they have a record of frustration and bitterness in seeking employment and because this agency, at first glance, seems to be the one that will afford them their sole chance, to find that this change is fantasy and that the opportunity is there for some privileged members of this under privileged class causes an increase in bitterness and frustration. This is the major result of the Progress for Providence hiring practices. When the disadvantaged groups see job advertisements for the agency and read job descriptions that they believe are not prohibitive to them, their hopes are aroused. To find after this that the democratic and open hiring they had expected is only a fantasy disguising the same old methods of choosing employees is a cruelty that Progress for Providence cannot be allowed to continue.

Therefore, the Council should insist that before any agency is designated, the Agency submit its hiring procedures and prepare a document, including job descriptions and requirements that represent the manner in which each job will be filled, and the minimum requirements for the job. Once these have

been completed, the Agency must abide by them. In addition, the practice of creating "Acting" Directors must end.. In the future, jobs should be advertised immediately as they become vacant and no agency staff member should be allowed to be appointed "Acting Director."

## 2. Establish Career Lattices

Because Progress for Providence is totally devoid of middle management positions and the possibility for orderly upward mobility, the Agency staff is clustered in two groups: the top, highly paid professionals, and the bottom, outreach worker and parent aides. The lack of any orderly mobility in turn caused a scramble for any jobs that become vacant, and this, coupled with disorderly hiring practices, in turn causes the kind of staff "politics" that lead to a concentration of one's self and his advancement rather than the good of the program.

In addition, because there are no middle jobs, the poor whom the program is supposed to serve are often locked into jobs at the bottom, earning barely better than the minimum wage while not gaining any marketable job skills.

Therefore, before Progress for Providence, or any other agency, can be designated the official anti-poverty program for the City of Providence, the Council must insist that the agency fulfill the following requirements:

a. That salaries be revised to be in conformity with state and city salary averages to encourage outward mobility of personnel from Progress for Providence to the private sector.

b. That job descriptions include a ladder or lattice indicating to the applicant what jobs he might realistically expect to advance to within the Agency, based on quality of performance and completion of training.

c. That, as a corollary, the Agency move immediately to readjust its budgets to include monies for training of its nonprofessional personnel by an accredited institution. Except for orientation and on-the-job training, which may be conducted by Progress for Providence, it is imperative and is ordered by the Council that training be accomplished in such a way and by such an institution that the nonprofessionals will gain recognized training and skills, which private employers can rate according to established scales.

d. That the submitting Agency submit to the Council sophisticated plans for its personnel structure to include meaningful middle management jobs for which its nonprofessionals can qualify after training and work experience within the Agency.

e. That these middle management and semi-skilled jobs be directly related to existing jobs in the private sector, so that, in effect, the Agency becomes a vast training and laboratory experience and there can be immediate transfer of training which prepares indigenous residents of the inner-city for eventual permanent employment in public and private agencies and institutions.

f. That the Agency make available to its nonprofessional staff counselling, testing and other advantages on a formalized basis, and that plans for this activity be submitted to the Council in contemplation of designation. This counselling should include, at a minimum, discussions of employment opportunities both within the Agency and in the private sector, so that nonprofessional employees will be able to make informed career decisions and begin a planned program of career development.

g. That in conjunction with the conditions described in the section above, the submitting agency begin to negotiate with other agencies and institutions to plan rationally programs through which Agency employees may be employed as permanent employees of established agencies and companies.

Emphasis in these negotiations should include the possibility of delegation of complete programs so that established agencies will supervise and assist in the training of personnel who eventually may work for them full-time.

Since many of the prospective jobs for paraprofessionals will be working in the state agencies, it is also recommended that a designate begin working with the Federal Coordinator for the State as well as with heads of State Departments to organize a plan for a state-wide Public Services Careers training program.

h. That the Agency design formal evaluation form for each job description, based on quality of work in training and on the job, so that promotions will be based on rational criteria rather than subjective decisions and favoritism, and so that clear references can be written for personnel seeking jobs in the private sector.

### 3. Establish a Fair and Rational Procedure for Termination

At present decisions on terminations, when they occur, are based on subjective decisions, often without sufficient evidence of poor performance on the job. With the creation of an employee evaluation system, supervisors should keep daily accounts of the performance of their subordinates, so that decisions can be made and verified regarding either promotions, raises or terminations

In addition, given the Agency's basic responsibility to the poor, in the case of terminations of poor persons, evaluations should be made regarding the cause of failure on the job, counselling should be instituted and an attempt made to place the nonprofessional in another role in which he may be more successful. Once placed, he should receive the maximum available supportive services from the Agency so that failure will not recur. Since it may be

assumed that professionals have adequate training and should be experienced in their roles, no such reassignment is necessary, and they may be terminated without any attempt to have them continue to work in the Agency.

4. All of these conditions should be included in a more definitive document on personnel policies.

5. Reallocation of funds and positions to create more middle management training positions.

The testimony has revealed that Progress for Providence spends a disproportionate percentage of its annual budget on highly paid personnel in the Central Staff. As part of the requirements for designation the Council recommends that an Agency take immediate steps to reduce the numbers of persons among the top supervisory staff and begin to utilize these funds to create middle level jobs for poor persons whom the Agency will train. Some recommendations for specific positions to be cut from the budget include the duplicate administrations of social work, recreation, and education.

Other funds that have been revealed as possible for reallocation for middle job positions are those now allocated for employee pensions. While sickness and major medical benefits are important, on-going benefits for all employees, and are especially important for low-paid nonprofessionals who may be decimated by a sickness in the family, a pension implies that this Agency will be in business forever. Since a "war on poverty" properly organized, should result in a victory, it may be assumed that Progress for Providence or any other designate should plan for its own phasing out and should consider itself a temporary agency. Because of this pensions represent a contradiction of the term "war on poverty" and should be discontinued so that more funds can be allocated to winning the war.

In conjunction with this particular allocation, it was brought to the attention of the Council that Community School aides do not share the same benefits as others in the poverty program. This situation should be rectified immediately, since these are the poor people who receive the fewest benefits from the program in terms of salaries and wages and are therefore most in need of fringe benefits.

6. Reorganize and Change the Role of the Central Staff

At present, the Central Staff is organized to operate programs. Each program has its own director who supervises the operation of his project and the delivery of his particular form of service to the poor. Decisions are made by that staff as to what services should be rendered, with little reference to the individual differences in the neighborhoods. These director positions should be abolished, and neighborhoods should be allowed to make their own choice of consulting assistance in developing programs, with funds assigned to the neighborhoods for use when they have made these choices.

The Central Staff of course has fiscal responsibility for federal funds, and therefore it should retain the roles of fiscal accountability, evaluation of all programs operated by the neighborhoods, and review of neighborhood plans for compliance with federal regulations. In addition, there is an advantage in variety of training and education opportunities that can be offered through a city central agency wide coordinated effort.

Finally, the position of Executive Director should be retained as a liaison between neighborhoods and for ease in negotiations with State, City and Federal Agencies and to assume overall responsibility for the program throughout the inner-city target areas.

As a second condition, the Council must have assurance from the

Executive Director and the Board of Directors that this Central Staff, and, for that matter, all the staff of the agency, are genuinely accountable to neighborhood residents and responsive to their needs. As an assurance of this, the Agency should revise its bylaws to include provision for either election of the top staff or an annual or semi-annual vote of confidence on their performance and responsiveness or make some other mutually satisfactory provision to insure that neighborhood residents are served by personnel in whom they have every confidence.

This recommendation should reduce the "arrogance" of the staff and encourage the kinds of responsibility that is accepted by elected administrative officials in city and state government and reduce the kinds of feelings of invulnerability that leads to belief in infallibility and resulting paternalistic feelings toward the poor by the very people who should be most responsive to their needs and desires.

In addition, it might be well to put a time limit on every job. No persons working in the "poverty system" and especially professionals, should continue in this work for more than a few years. At the end of this time there is often a tendency to become entrenched bureaucracy, protective of one's own job at the expense of the kind of dedication that takes risks to improve the lives of the poor.

7. Planning should be more individualized and should change based on changing needs in individualized neighborhood situations.

While many federally funded programs have strict guidelines indicating exactly how funds may be expended, the O.E.O. Versatile CAP money has no such restrictions. Therefore, these funds, amounting to almost \$2 million annually, should be used for innovative programs which cannot be funded elsewhere, not



for continuing programs which have outlived their initial impact, and become bureaucratic and traditional.

New programs should also be delegated as often as possible in order to increase the opportunity for impact on existing agencies, to improve the atmosphere for hiring neighborhood residents, and to reduce the possibility that new personnel hired for these programs will become more interested in continuing their own jobs than in the need for change in programs to respond to changing neighborhood needs.

All plans should be designed with the assistance of subcommittees from the neighborhoods which are directed to the subject to be included in the grant application. In this way, plans will accurately reflect the stated needs and desires of neighborhood residents, rather than agency personnel.

8. There should be a complete reorganization and change in the Research and Evaluation Department.

One of the major problems in justifying the activities of Progress for Providence is the lack of any hard data on the Agency's successes and failures and on the validity of the approaches taken in the "war on poverty." This failure also made it extremely difficult for the elected Councilmen responsible for program review and designation to make any balanced determination of the value of the program and whether or not they should approve it for another year of operation.

Therefore, before an Agency is designated the official anti-poverty program for the City of Providence, it is absolutely imperative that a new system for evaluation be developed that will provide easily understandable, relevant monthly reports for review by the Neighborhood Interim Boards, the Board of Directors, the City Council, the State Department of Community Affairs,

the Regional Office of Economic Opportunity and other cooperating agencies or governmental and private institutions.

This new evaluation system should be tied in with an on-line computer system, so that information will be immediately available for retrieval, and evaluation will not suffer from the "lag of six to eight weeks before. . . a report (is published)." (Nalbandian, 77) In addition to increased efficiency in the new system, costs should be reduced in this aspect of the program: there is no justification for an annual expenditure of approximately \$100,00 of money that should be directed to the problems of the poor for an average of one report per year, or a cost of \$100,000 per report.

Also, it has been brought to the attention of the Council that the Research and Evaluation Department of Progress for Providence will begin to supervise the evaluation of the Concentrated Employment Program in the coming year. Because of C.E.P.'s many problems, it is important that that program component have an independent evaluation conducted by an outside agency.

9. Lines of communication must be improved.

With the reduction in size and numbers of supervisory duties assigned to the Central Staff, this group should become a liaison body between neighborhoods, providing them with the latest information on programs from Washington. and an inter-neighborhood bulletin describing programs in each neighborhood. Therefore, before the Council can consider designating an agency as its official anti-poverty agency, a formalized system must be devised, and specific funds allocated in the budget for such public information tools as a weekly or bi-weekly newsletter, flyers, public service announcements and the like. This newsletter should also delegate space of at least one page of each edition for evaluation of programs, so that neighborhood residents will have the proper

data and information on which to base decisions made in the advisory committees.

10. End duplication of effort and administrative waste.

In order to cut budgets and allocate more funds to the employment and training of neighborhood residents and to open opportunities for them to work in the private sector, the Agency should take immediate steps to begin to delegate programs and technical assistance roles to existing agencies. A report on the steps taken, the lines of communication, coordination and cooperation established should be submitted to the Board of Directors and Council within one months of this report. Thereafter, the administration should submit monthly reports to the Board of Directors and Council stating the agency's progress and problems in this area of effort. An evaluation report should also be attached, listing as minimum requirements, the numbers of persons leaving the agency for private employment, the training they have received while in agency employ, their background, and the method through which they obtained the new job. Other categories of inquiry should also be included in this questionnaire, as well as a narrative explanation including totals, fields of reference, and percentages.

12. Delineate Agency goals and objectives, both long and short range, into measurable terms.

The objectives, goals and philosophy of Progress for Providence are presently worded in idealistic terms, incapable of any definitive evaluation. Before the Council can redesignate Progress for Providence the official anti-poverty agency for the City, goals, objectives, and basic agency philosophy must be redefined in behavior terms which can be related to, and measured by, the new evaluation system.

These goals, objectives and philosophy should be specific for each program, so that programs can be measured and future priorities determined. In this way, such popular and successful programs as the Health Clinics will not find themselves without funds, while other programs such as Community Schools Administration are overfunded.

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Respectfully submitted



Frank Caprio, Chairman

Submitted To City Council  
Frank Caprio  
Chairman - Comm. Urban  
Redevelopment, Renewal & Planning

CITY OF PROVIDENCE  
PROVIDENCE, Sc.

COMMITTEE ON URBAN REDEVELOP-  
MENT, RENEWAL AND PLANNING

MINORITY REPORT

This report is presented as a dissenting opinion as to some of the conclusions of the majority report of the Committee on Urban Redevelopment, Renewal and Planning of the City Council of the City of Providence of the State of Rhode Island made public on December 8, 1969 and prepared by Councilman Frank Caprio, Chairman. Beginning in the Spring of 1969, the Committee held approximately seven hearings, received numerous documents and complaints, heard numerous witnesses and recorded over 600 pages of testimony in its investigation of Progress for Providence, Inc. which is the local agency for the "antipoverty" programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity of the federal government.

Conclusions

1. The local antipoverty program has been inefficient, bungling and guilty of tremendous waste. The poor and needy of the City were getting shortchanged. Some of the poor got very little help and most got no help from the several millions of dollars spent on these programs in the City of Providence. Too much of the money spent has been used up in administration and too little actually gets to the poor in services or direct aid. For example, the Neighborhood Legal Services program was spending almost \$300,000 per year on a smaller caseload than that handled by the Rhode Island Legal Aid Society which was operating on a \$30,000 per year appropriation, or one-tenth of the cost of the Neighborhood Legal Services program.

2. The waste and bungling was inevitable because the program was ill conceived. The planners and administrators of the local antipoverty programs had the colossal gall to believe that they could set up several new programs and agencies with inexperienced persons and make them work. The

originators mistakenly believed that all it takes is enough money. Instead, the evidence showed the opposite. For example, the two million dollars per year spent by the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) was and is being almost completely wasted without adequately helping the poor. The amount of money spent on a program has no necessary correlation with effectively helping the poor.

3. Existing and experienced agencies that had dozens of years know-how in helping the poor should be the only agencies to handle O.E.O. programs locally. For example, the Boys Clubs, C.Y.O. and Y.M.C.A. with their experienced personnel and know-how should run the youth programs; Rhode Island Legal Aid Society should run the legal program; and good private or public schools should run the educational programs. More service to the poor and at approximately one-tenth the cost would result in this approach.

4. The O.E.O. Program should be reevaluated at the national level but, in the interim, a crash program should be instituted to terminate immediately all existing wasteful programs and making prompt use of experienced local agencies and services by beefing them up with subsidies. For example, a dollar spent in getting existing hospitals to expand and beef up their health clinics would provide better and more service to the poor. This is much better than spending money on new clinics which could not get adequate and experienced staff and equipment promptly enough. It is ironic that the very time the local hospitals can't get enough help we created a new competitor. At the same time, complaints are being made of surplus and overlapping hospital services in our community, the local OEO agency is trying to further duplicate the services rather than improve existing ones.

5. All local private agencies, such as Rhode Island Legal Aid, hospitals, Boys Clubs, schools, etc. should come forward as a community service and make proposals to operate the various programs which they can best do. They will be fully paid for their expenses and the poor will get better services. The Providence City Council and all OEO local, state and national officials should invite and encourage these private agencies to make proposals without delay.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS W. PEARLMAN  
Republican Minority Leader  
Providence City Council